SMU Science and Technology Law Review
Volume 24

Number 2

Article 4

2021

Abolishing the Communications Decency Act Might Sanitize
“Politically Biased,” “Digitally Polluted” and “Dangerously Toxic”
Social Media? ― Judicial and Statistical Guidance From FederalPreemption, Safe-Harbor and Rights-Preservation Decisions
Willy E. Rice
Saint Mary's University School of Law

Recommended Citation
Willy E Rice, Abolishing the Communications Decency Act Might Sanitize “Politically Biased,” “Digitally
Polluted” and “Dangerously Toxic” Social Media? ― Judicial and Statistical Guidance From FederalPreemption, Safe-Harbor and Rights-Preservation Decisions, 24 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 257 (2021)
https://scholar.smu.edu/scitech/vol24/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in SMU Science and Technology Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more
information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

Abolishing the Communications Decency Act
Might Sanitize “Politically Biased,” “Digitally
Polluted,” and “Dangerously Toxic” Social
Media?—Judicial and Statistical Guidance
From Federal-Preemption, Safe-Harbor
and Rights-Preservation Decisions
Willy E. Rice*
ABSTRACT
Sitting and former U.S. Presidents as well as members of the general
public, financial, political and educational institutions use social media. Yet,
an overwhelming majority of users, content creators, parents, “conservatives,” “progressives,” Democrats and Republicans distrust social media
owners. Some critics allege that owners “digitally pollute” platforms by encouraging users to post “corrosive, dangerous, toxic and illegal content.”1
Other critics assert that service providers’ purportedly objective contentmoderation algorithms are biased—discriminating irrationally on the basis of
users’ political association, ideology, socioeconomic status, gender and
ethnicity.2 Republicans and Democrats have crafted roughly twenty bills on
this matter.3 In theory, the enacted proposals would “sanitize” social media
and end owners’ allegedly irrational practices—by abolishing, reforming or
“limiting the scope” of the safe-harbor-preemption defense under the Communications Decency Act § 230.4 But, would the proposals actually increase
users’ ability to survive a preemption defense and sue providers on the merits? The bills’ sponsors have not carefully weighed this question. To fill the
*
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1.

See infra note 23 and accompanying text.

2.

See infra notes 29–36 and accompanying text.

3.

Katherine Klosek, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act: Research
Library Perspectives, ASS’N OF RSCH. LIBRS. 3 (June 2021), https://
www.arl.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/2021.07.06-Issue-Brief-Section-230of-Communications-Decency-Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G5P-VT98].

4.

See infra notes 23, 57, 246 and accompanying text.
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void, the author conducted a legal and empirical study to glean probative
evidence from state and federal courts’ section 230 preemption decisions.
Among other findings, the analyses reveal: (1) courts are more likely to block
only certain users’ or content creators’ lawsuits when tech companies raise a
section 230 preemption defense; (2) judges are more likely to allow a section
230 defense to thwart content creators’ tort-based rather than contract-based
lawsuits; and (3) content creators are more likely to evade a preemption defense and litigate claims on the merits, if a federal statute contains a safe
harbor clause as well as an unequivocal rights-preservation exemption.
Hopefully, the findings will provide some “judicial guidance”—when Congress considers whether to abolish, reform or restrict the scope of the CDA’s
section 230 immunity defense.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Debatably, mainstream media comprises the major television networks
and newspapers.5 From the mid-1950s to the late-1960s, these were “trusted
American institutions.”6 Both news networks and newspapers earned a sixtysix percent credibility rating.7 Then, in the early-1970s, mass media’s
favorability ratings dropped dramatically.8 Even more impressive, between
1998 and 2020, polling data revealed that the overwhelming majority of
Americans seriously disliked and distrusted the mainstream media.9
On the other hand, as mainstream media’s credibility and relevance continued to decline, large social media platforms10 began to appear on the In-

5.

See Erik Wemple, Is Fox News Part of the Mainstream Media? It Depends,
WASH. POST, (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erikwemple/wp/2017/03/14/is-fox-news-part-of-the-mainstream-media-it-depends/
[https://perma.cc/J7DL-J9XC] (“A Nexis search for ‘mainstream news media’
or ‘mainstream media’ . . . yields no results in the 1970s, more than 200 in the
1980s, and then an unfetchable number of hits for [later] decades. . . . [T]he
mainstream media [is] . . . simply ‘major television networks and newspapers
[that] are biased right or left but pretend to be neutral.”).

6.

See JONATHAN M. LADD, WHY AMERICANS HATE
MATTERS 1–2 (2012).

7.

Id.

8.

Id.

9.

See Megan Brenan, Americans Remain Distrustful of Mass Media, GALLUP
NEWS (Sept. 30, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/321116/americans-remain-distrustful-mass-media.aspx [https://perma.cc/R6EH-EPK9] (“[T]he public remains largely distrustful of the mass media. [Forty percent] . . . have ‘a
great deal’ or ‘a fair amount’ of trust and confidence in the media to report the
news ‘fully, accurately, and fairly,’ while [sixty percent do] ‘not very much’
trust or ‘[any] at all.’”).

10.

See LADD, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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ternet.11 Arguably, MySpace.com was the first and largest platform to
emerge at the dawn of the twenty-first century. In 2004, an estimated one
million monthly and active users visited the MySpace site.12 Twenty years
later, nearly four billion people regularly access and use one or more social
media platforms.13 Presently, seventy percent of Americans, or 231.47 million people, have a social media account.14
Unquestionably, “social media has changed the world”15—altering how
users exchange information, access news, organize political and economic
ventures, establish interpersonal relationships, advertise services, and sell
products.16 Yet, the largest owners of social media platforms17— Facebook,
YouTube, WeChat, WhatsApp, Instagram and Twitter— achieved in twentyfive years what mainstream-media owners achieved only after a half century.18 As of this writing, an overwhelming majority of users—spanning all
economic, political, social, educational and religious groups—strongly distrust the owners of the largest social media platforms.19 Why?
11.

12.
13.

14.
15.
16.

17.

18.

19.

See Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, The Rise of Social Media, OUR WORLD DATA (Sept.
18, 2019), https://ourworldindata.org/rise-of-social-media [https://perma.cc/
DR2H-N58F].
Id.
See Brian Dean, Social Network Usage & Growth Statistics: How Many People
Use Social Media in 2021?, BACKLINKO (Apr. 26, 2021), https://backlinko.com/social-media-users#social-media-growth-in-the-us [https://perma.cc/
9UUW-CM7A] (“Since its inception in 1996, social media has . . . infiltrate[d]
half of the 7.7 billion people in the world. Social network platforms almost
tripled their total user base—from 970 million in 2010 to . . . 4.48 billion users
in 2021.”).
Id.
See Ortiz-Ospina, supra note 11.
See The 7 different types of social media, BITEABLE, https://biteable.com/blog/
the-7-different-types-of-social-media/ [ https://perma.cc/AR68-G7K2] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) (outlining the utilities of various social media platforms).
See H. Tankovska, Global Social Networks Ranked by Number of Users 2021,
STATISTA (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/ [https://perma.cc/XM5B-VN2E].
See LADD, supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Thomas Aichner,
Matthias Grünfelder, Oswin Maurer & Deni Jegeni, Twenty-Five Years of Social Media: A Review of Social Media Applications and Definitions from 1994
to 2019, 24 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAV. & SOC. NETWORKING 215, 215
(2021), https://doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2020.0134 [https://perma.cc/32ZZSFQY].
See Brooke Auxier, 64% of Americans Say Social Media Have A Mostly Negative Effect on the Way Things Are Going in the U.S. Today, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Oct. 15, 2020), www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/15/64-of-americanssay-social-media-have-a-mostly-negative-effect-on-the-way-things-are-goingin-the-u-s-today/ [https://perma.cc/VXH5-BJ7A].
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Users, consumers, as well as the owners of mainstream-media, employ
various metaphors to explain their strong dissatisfaction.20 First, numerous
critics assert seriously and passionately that the largest social media companies are “environmental polluters”—just like many large chemical and energy companies.21 Briefly put, the twentieth-century polluters “dumped toxic
waste in lakes, streams, rivers and the air.”22 And, critics assert: YouTube,
Facebook, Instagram and other big tech companies “digitally pollute the internet ecosystem” by allowing users to post and share highly “corrosive,
toxic and illegal content.”23
20.

See Billy Perrigo, Big Tech’s Business Model Is a Threat to Democracy. Here’s
How to Build a Fairer Digital Future, TIME (Jan. 22, 2021), https://time.com/
5931597/internet-reform-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/AVW9-WB6G] (arguing that “[t]he global tide of public opinion is turning against the tech companies,” and offering a metaphor—depicting social media platforms as factories
leaking toxic waste and needing plugs and regulations to detoxify more than a
decade’s worth of pollution); Bruce Reed & James P. Steyer, Why Section 230
Hurts Kids, and What To Do About It, PROTOCOL (Dec. 8, 2020), https://
www.protocol.com/why-section-230-hurts-kids [https://perma.cc/EK2CCAZP] (observing that a polluter pays compensation to mitigate environmental
damage, stressing that the same remedy can help detoxify the online environment, and arguing that social media platforms should be liable for “any content
that generates revenue [from] ads that appear alongside harmful content.”); but
see Mike Masnick, Biden’s Top Tech Advisor Trots Out Dangerous Ideas For
“Reforming” Section 230, TECHDIRT (Dec. 9, 2020), https://
www.techdirt.com/articles/20201208/17023245848/bidens-top-tech-advisortrots-out-dangerous-ideas-reforming-section-230.shtml [https://perma.cc/JDT3PRBA] (rejecting the “dangerous” environmental-pollution metaphor and
stressing that so-called social media “pollution . . . is 1st Amendment protected
speech.”).

21.

See Roger McNamee, Opinion: America has Experience Curbing Dangerous
Industries. We can do the Same with Tech., WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/02/18/regulating-tech-industry-history-roger-mcnamee/ [https://perma.cc/EV4A-TB9B].

22.

Id.

23.

See Ryan Tracy & John D. McKinnon, Congress Gets Fuel to Rein in Big Tech
Firms—After Social Media Sparked Capitol Attack, Stripping Back Liability
Shield Is on the Table, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2021, at A6 (arguing that big tech
firms must moderate users’ posts or content which can “incite violence,” “riots,” and endanger “the internet ecosystem.”); Ian Weiner, Civil Rights Laws
Will Significantly Benefit From Hirono, Warner, Klobuchar Section 230 Communications Decency Act Reform Proposals, LAWS,’ COMM. FOR CIV. RTS.
UNDER L. (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.lawyerscommittee.org/civil-rights-lawswill-significantly-benefit-from-hirono-warner-section-230-communications-decency-act-reform-proposals/ [https://perma.cc/ZA8J-TRA7] (“[The Lawyers’
Committee endorses] the ‘Safeguarding Against Fraud, Exploitation, Threats,
Extremism and Consumer Harms Act.’ . . . This bill would make irresponsible
big tech companies accountable for the digital pollution they knowingly and
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Countless other critics as well as the competitive owners of mainstream
media argue that tech companies’ purportedly objective and predictively
sound “algorithmic content moderation” tools are discriminatory and/or illusive.24 Stated another way, dissatisfied social media users and others assert
that tech companies’ content-moderation algorithms are inherently biased
against certain classes of users.25 For example, in recent years, YouTube removed 500 million comments, deleted 100,000 videos, and terminated
17,000 channels.26 According to YouTube, the offending content providers
were spreading “hate speech” against certain classes of people on the basis of
willfully produce.”); Steven Hill, How to Deal with US Social Media: Mr.
Biden, Revoke Section 230, GLOBALIST (Jan. 14, 2021) (emphasis added),
https://www.theglobalist.com/united-states-democracy-social-media-facebooktwitter-youtube-big-tech-misinformation/ [https://perma.cc/XKJ7-G2M7] (arguing that “Big Tech Media [should be] responsible and . . . liable for . . . toxic
and illegal content . . . that is published and promoted [on] their media
platforms.”).
24.

See Céline Castets-Renard, Algorithmic Content Moderation on Social Media
in EU Law: Illusion of Perfect Enforcement, 2020 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y
283, 309–13 (2020) (emphasis added) (“[Social media providers] do more than
passively distribute users’ content and facilitate users’ interactions. . . . [Arguably, their] algorithmic decision-making would be the most effective way to
provide perfect enforcement. However, this is an illusion . . . [A]utomated decision-making systems are opaque, . . . [producing an] over-removal chilling
effect.”); see also Jonathan Taplin, How to Force 8Chan, Reddit and Others to
Clean Up, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/
opinion/8chan-reddit-youtube-el-paso.html [https://perma.cc/E566-H9V7]
(criticizing network providers— Cloudflare, YouTube and Facebook—for allowing certain users to post an allegedly “toxic mix of hatred, violence and . . .
conspiracies.”); Tom Rogers, How to Regulate Social Media When There Is No
Good Answer, CNBC (June 8, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/08/oped-how-to-regulate-social-media-when-there-is-no-good-answer.html [https://
perma.cc/BKL2-UM3U] (criticizing the president of Facebook for allowing
President Donald Trump’s allegedly toxic post to remain on the platform while
removing others).

25.

See Merlyna Lim, How Biased Algorithms and Moderation Are Censoring Activists on Social Media, THE NEXT WEB (May 18, 2021, 6:10 AM), https://
thenextweb.com/news/how-biased-algorithms-and-moderation-are-censoringactivists-on-social-media-syndication [https://perma.cc/YF42-PD6F] (“Algorithmic bias may jeopardize some people who are already at risk by wrongly
categorizing them as offensive, criminals or even terrorists. . . . While AI is
celebrated as autonomous technology, . . . it is inherently biased. The inequalities that underpin bias already exist in society and influence who gets the opportunity to build algorithms and their databases, and for what purpose.”).

26.

See Sean Burch, YouTube Deletes 500 Million Comments in Fight Against
“Hate Speech”, THE WRAP (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.thewrap.com/youtubedeletes-500-million-comments-in-fight-against-hate-speech/ [https://perma.cc/
8JWG-FEX].
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“age, gender, race, caste, religion, sexual orientation or veteran status.”27 But,
critics insist such universal, persistent and questionable moderation practices
actually censor adults’ innocent and conversational speech, which is protected under the First Amendment.28
Even more damaging, some users as well as tech companies’ mainstream-media competitors assert platform providers’ content-moderation algorithms discriminate irrationally based on users’ political affiliations,29
professional status,30 ideology,31 religion,32 ethnicity,33 activism,34 socioeco27.

Id.

28.

See, e.g., Fed. Agency of News LLC, v. Facebook, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1295,
1303 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (embracing Facebook’s immunity-preemption defense
and declaring that plaintiffs’ First-Amendment claim failed because “Facebook
is not a state actor, and the First Amendment only applies to state actors or
private entities whose actions amount to state action.”).

29.

See Evelyn Douek, More Content Moderation Is Not Always Better, WIRED
(June 2, 2021), https://www.wired.com/story/more-content-moderation-not-always-better/ [https://perma.cc/DN48-PB2S] (“Content moderation is eating the
world. . . . [T]ens of thousands of users are given the boot in regular fell
swoops. . . . They [even] deplatformed . . . the sitting President of the United
States.”).

30.

Id. (“[Social media providers continue] . . . to impose more and more guardrails
on what people can say. . . . [Providers] stepped in with unusual swiftness to
downrank or block a story from a major media outlet.” (emphasis added)).

31.

Id.

32.

See Ryan Mac, Instagram Censored Posts About One of Islam’s Holiest
Mosques, Drawing Employee Ire, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 12, 2021), https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/instagram-facebook-censored-alaqsa-mosque [https://perma.cc/ZG34-J44C] (“Instagram removed posts and
blocked hashtags about one of Islam’s holiest mosques. . . . [The] content moderation system mistakenly associated the site with . . . terrorist organizations. . . . The mistake is . . . Instagram and its parent-company Facebook’s
latest content moderation failure. . . .”).

33.

Cf. Aylin Caliskan, Detecting and Mitigating Bias in Natural Language
Processing, BROOKINGS (May 10, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/research/
detecting-and-mitigating-bias-in-natural-language-processing/ [https://
perma.cc/4J4E-SAYS] (“Like other AI algorithms that reflect the status quo, all
social groups that [do not comprise] white men are represented as minority
groups due to a lack of accurate and unbiased data to train word embeddings. . . . [M]embers of multiple minority groups . . . are strongly associated
with various disadvantaging biases . . . .”).

34.

See generally Merlyna Lim & Ghadah Alrasheed, Beyond a Technical Bug:
Biased Algorithms and Moderation Are Censoring Activists on Social Media,
THE CONVERSATION (May 16, 2021), https://theconversation.com/beyond-atechnical-bug-biased-algorithms-and-moderation-are-censoring-activists-on-social-media-160669 [https://perma.cc/7MTZ-GJD6].
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nomic status35 and/or facial features.36 To illustrate, a group of interested
persons established Red Dress Day to raise awareness about Missing and
Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG).37 Some supporters
posted pro-MMIWG comments on Instagram.38 In the course of events, the
comments mysteriously disappeared from the platform.39 Instagram issued an
apology— simply stating that “a technical bug” deleted the posts.40 On a
different occasion, Facebook— the owner of Instagram—removed women’s
posts that mentioned “anything even remotely negative about men.”41 However, posts that “disparaged or threatened women” remained on Facebook.42
Responding to disgruntled users’, politicians’, and mainstream-media
owners’ criticisms, social media companies strongly assert: (1) the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA)43 allows and even encourages companies to moderate social media content;44 (2) sophisticated content-moderation
tools efficiently, speedily and effectively prevent toxic, dangerous and hateful content from polluting social media platforms;45 (3) discrimination is the
35.

See Scott Rosenberg & Sara Fischer, TikTok’s Content-Moderation Time
Bomb, AXIOS (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.axios.com/tiktoks-content-moderation-time-bomb-56ed658b-eb4d-4366-a1b6-d4622d1959c3.html [https://
perma.cc/3CKF-9QSN] (“TikTok . . . asked moderators to suppress content
from ‘ugly’ or ‘poor’ people to keep undesirable users away from the
service.”).

36.

Id.

37.

See Lim & Alrasheed, supra note 34 and accompanying text.

38.

Id.

39.

Id.

40.

Id.

41.

See Snigdha Bansal, Facebook Groups Say They Were Censored Just for Using
the Word ‘Men’, VICE (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.vice.com/en/article/
bvx5p5/facebook-tag-groups-men-misogyny-women-hate-speech [https://
perma.cc/HVC3-VP9W].

42.

Id.

43.

See generally infra Part II and accompanying text.

44.

See Lauren Feiner, Big Tech’s Favorite Law Is Under Fire, CNBC (Feb. 19,
2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/19/what-is-section-230-and-why-dosome-people-want-to-change-it.html [https://perma.cc/BBV7-W744] (“Tech
companies have vigorously defended Section 230 [before Congress, stressing
that the Act] allows them to remove the most objectionable content from their
platforms.”).

45.

Cf. Taplin, supra note 24 (“[T]wo mass shootings at mosques . . . were livestreamed on Facebook and . . . viewed millions of times on YouTube. . . .
[Although Facebook used] A.I. to block 90 percent of the Christchurch
streams, . . . Mark Zuckerberg [told] Congress that it might take five to 10
years to perfect these tools. But . . . banning toxic content must become the
highest priority at 8chan, Reddit, Facebook and YouTube.”).
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very essence of any algorithmic-content-moderation tool;46 and (4) the algorithms, however, do not discriminate irrationally against any class of users.47
Unsurprisingly, embittered “progressive” and “conservative” users, as
well as congressional Republicans and Democrats, summarily dismissed
these defenses.48 But even more thought-provoking, some mainstream-media
owners and analysts—who professedly support First-Amendment protections—have encouraged Congress to enact a mixture of novel and controversial reforms that would arguably interfere with social media owners’
constitutional rights.49 Among others, there are several controversial and
strongly recommended reforms: (1) Congress should add a broad private
rights of action exemption to the CDA50—like the rights-preservation clauses
in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA);51 (2) the CDA should contain both a broader rightspreservation exemption52 and a safe-harbor defense—like those in the Fed46.

Cf. Weiner, supra note 23 (“For far too long online platforms have . . . allowed
misinformation, algorithmic discrimination, and online hate to be
weaponized. . . . [Our] bill would make irresponsible big tech companies accountable for the digital pollution [which] they knowingly and willfully produce, while continuing to protect free speech online.” (emphasis added)).

47.

Id.

48.

Cf. Mark MacCarthy, Back to the Future for Section 230 Reform, LAWFARE
(Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.lawfareblog.com/back-future-section-230-reform
[https://perma.cc/G6NQ-23A6] (“Reform of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act is on the agenda for both . . . Congress and the Biden administration. . . . Some conservative[s] . . . want to exempt sex trafficking and child
sexual abuse material [from Section 230 immunity]. . . . Progressives . . . want
platforms to be less hostile toward speech from marginalized groups . . . [and]
make Section 230 immunity contingent on a court’s determination of reasonable content moderation practices.” (emphasis added)).

49.

Cf. Emily Bazelon, The Problem of Free Speech in an Age of Disinformation,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/13/magazine/
free-speech.html [https://perma.cc/PU2Y-RPBH] (“It’s an article of faith . . .
that more speech is better. . . . But increasingly, scholars of constitutional law
as well as [mainstream media] . . . are beginning to question the way we . . .
think about the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. . . . [I]n the United
States and other democracies, there is a different kind of threat. . . . It encompasses the mass distortion of truth and overwhelming waves of speech from
extremists that smear and distract. . . . [S]ocial media sites . . . function as the
public square. . . . [But social media sites also] leaned on First Amendment
principles to keep secret the identities of people who appear to abuse their
services.”).

50.

See generally infra Part V and accompanying text.

51. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2018).
52.

See generally infra Part V and accompanying text.
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eral Arbitration Act (FAA);53 and (3) the CDA’s current safe-harbor defense
should be severely weakened.54
Presently, state and federal courts interpret the CDA’s section 230 immunity provision broadly.55 Understandably, tech companies celebrate the
pro-immunity rulings for rational reasons: (1) a successful section 230 defense efficiently, quickly and effectively preempts users’ and other plaintiffs’
direct- or vicarious-liability lawsuits—before any theory of recovery can be
litigated on the merits; and (2) a successful defense reduces significantly tech
companies’ legal expenses.56 Therefore, in light of social media owners’
asymmetrical advantages, Senate and House members have introduced at
least twenty bills that would “abolish, reform or limit the scope” of the
CDA’s immunity defense.57 Even more interesting, mainstream-media owners have also suggested some possibly “self-serving” reforms.58
53. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16; see also infra Part V and accompanying text.
54.

See Taplin, supra note 24 (asserting that politicians can stop the spread of online hatred by revising the safe harbor provisions of the Communications Decency Act).

55.

See Shiamili v. Real Est. Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (N.Y.
2011); see also Feiner, supra note 44 (“Attorney General William Barr . . .
[told] a gathering of the National Association of Attorneys General . . . [that
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act] has been interpreted quite
broadly by the courts.”).

56.

See e.g., MacCarthy, supra note 48 (observing that social media providers may
secure immunity without extended court proceedings by invoking Section
230(c)(1), which immunizes any action if a provider simply removes or filters
content).

57.

See generally Kiran Jeevanjee et al., All the Ways Congress Wants to Change
Section 230, SLATE (Mar. 23, 2021), https://slate.com/technology/2021/03/section-230-reform-legislative-tracker.html [https://perma.cc/3MFQ-GPTF] (reporting that “[a] flurry of bills were introduced in Congress between 2020 and
2021” and disclosing that the Tech, Law, & Security Program at the American
University-Washington College of Law and at Duke University’s Center on
Science & Technology Policy are partnering to track all proposed section-230
legislation).

58.

Compare Taplin, supra note 24 (“[T]he largest corporations in the world—
Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon—[behave like] CBS, Fox, NBC or
ABC. . . . Changing the safe harbor laws . . . would incentivize Facebook and
YouTube to take things like the deep-fake . . . [and] church shooting videos
more seriously. Congress must revisit the safe harbor statutes [to ensure] that
active intermediaries are held legally responsible for the content on their
sites.”), with Jonathan Cook, We Can Defeat the Corporate Media’s War to
Snuff Out Independent Journalism, COMMON DREAMS (May 18, 2021), https://
www.commondreams.org/views/2021/05/18/we-can-defeat-corporate-mediaswar-snuff-out-independent-journalism [https://perma.cc/VGJ6-33R4] (“More
and more journalists are [leaving] . . . as corporate media becomes increasingly
unprofitable. . . . [Corporate media works extremely hard to characterize] new
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In theory, the reforms would increase content creators’ and other complainants’ ability to circumvent a section 230 federal preemption defense and
sue platform providers on the merits in state and federal courts.59 Still, important questions have emerged: Should Congress amend the CDA by seriously
considering and adopting a “mirror-image” of the CERCLA’s rights-preservation and safe harbor provisions? Would adding an FAA-like and unambiguous private-right-of-actions exemption actually enhance dissatisfied users’
or content providers’ capacity to evade Google’s, Facebook’s or Amazon’s
preemption defense and litigate all types of common-law and statutory
claims in state or federal courts?
Briefly put, as of this writing, CDA reformers have not carefully
weighed these and related questions. Therefore, this Article’s purpose is narrow: to help Congress fashion more balanced CDA section 230 reforms—by
adding a user-friendly, private-rights-of-actions exemption and by weakening social media companies’ current safe-harbor-immunity defense. And, to
help reach either goal, this Article presents judicial guidance and statistically
significant findings which were gleaned from an extensive analysis of all
reported CDA cases as well as from random samples of FAA and CERCLA
federal preemption decisions.
Part I begins the discussion by briefly outlining the various types of
social media providers and platforms. This part also outlines the types of
first- and third-party claims that plaintiffs have filed against social media
owners and content creators. Part II presents a brief history of the Communications Decency Act and its stated purpose. More narrowly, Part II reviews
the CDA’s safe harbor or immunity-protection clause and discusses the intended scope of platform providers’ direct and vicarious liabilities under section 230. Necessarily and respectively, Parts III and IV present examples of
judicial splits surrounding a hybrid question: whether section 230 absolutely
immunes social media service providers from direct as well as secondary
liability under all types of common-law and statutory theories of recovery.
Unexpectedly, several claim-specific rifts appear among and between state
and federal courts—even though social media users and third parties are generally less likely to prevail against tech companies in federal-preemption trials. Part V presents a short review of the proposed section 230 reforms—

technology as a threat to media’s freedoms. This [is a] self-serving argument. . . . Facebook and Twitter [rival] corporate media . . . for news dissemination. . . . [In response, corporate media assassinates the character of]
dissident journalists and browbeat the social media platforms that host
them. . . . Too often it is the critical thinking of dissident journalists that is
maligned as ‘fake news.’” (emphasis added)).
59.

Cf. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254
(4th Cir. 2009) (“[I]mmunity is an immunity from [a lawsuit] rather than a
mere defense to liability and. . . is effectively lost if a case is erroneously
permitted to go to trial.”).
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focusing carefully on the proposed private rights of action exemption and a
modified safe harbor provision.
There is one additional preliminary remark. As reported earlier, state,
and federal courts declare broadly that section 230(c)(1) protects social media companies from secondary liability when users’ tortious content harms
third parties.60 Still, some courts are likely to shelter tech companies from
secondary-liability lawsuits—based on whether the providers hosted,
curated, displayed, edited, or created the allegedly tortious content.61
Even more importantly, as of this writing, several procedural and substantive questions beg for answers: (1) whether state or federal courts are
more likely to protect service providers from users’ “direct liability” lawsuits, (2) whether social media providers are significantly more likely to secure immunity in trial or appellate courts, (3) whether social media
companies or content providers are significantly more likely to be liable for
causing tortious injuries, and (4) whether third-party complainants’ commonlaw or statutory claims increase social media companies’ likelihood of becoming secondarily liable for content creators’ intentional torts.
Part VI, therefore, presents the statistically significant findings of an
empirical study. The study measures the independent, combined, and concurrent influences of various factors—theories of recovery, types of third-party
claims, types of safe-harbor defenses and rights-preservation exemptions,
types of social media users, and types of third-party victims—on the dispositions of CDA section 230 preemption decisions in state and federal courts.
The Article concludes by encouraging members of Congress to weigh
carefully the “judicial guidance”—which was gleaned from the decisions—
as well as the statistically significant findings before abolishing, reforming or
limiting the scope of section 230. The reported findings are clear: Congress’s
simply adding CERCLA- and FAA-like provisions to the CDA will not substantially increase content providers’ likelihood of evading tech companies’
preemption challenges. On the other hand, Congress’s adding a broader private-rights-of-actions exemption to the CDA would probably increase users’
likelihood of gaining access to and receiving various remedies in state and
federal courts.

60.

See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 518 (Cal. 2006) (observing that a broad
reading of section 230(c)(1) immunity has been accepted in federal and state
courts); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010) (stressing that a
majority of federal circuits protect service providers from vicarious liability
under any theory of liability for third-party users’ harmful or injurious content);
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that courts
have construed section 230 immunity provisions broadly in legal disputes arising from the publication of a user-generated content).

61.

See Pace, v. Baker-White, 432 F. Supp. 3d 495, 503–06 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (suggesting that CDA section 230 cases appear along a continuum where internet
service providers’ and users’ “editorial control” determines the viability of an
immunity defense).
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS AND
TYPES OF PROVIDERS’ INTERFERENCES, EDITORIAL
PRACTICES AND CONTROLS
A cursory search of the Internet would retrieve numerous websites—
categorizing and explaining various types of social media platforms.62 Generally, “social media” comprises advertising, blogging, book-marketing, content-curation, consumer-shopping, consumer-review, image-sharing, mediasharing, publishing, social-networking, sharing-interests and video-hosting
platforms.63 YouTube and Vimeo are video-hosting sites.64 Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn are social-networking platforms.65 Yelp! and TripAdvisor
are social-review sites.66 Rover and AirBnB are shared-economy platforms,
which help consumers to locate goods and rentals.67 And, Instagram and
Snapchat are popular image-sharing platforms.68
Perhaps, social media companies only provide platforms rather than use
them. But, indisputably, only social media owners can decide what appears
on their platforms.69 Consequently, state and federal courts weigh a continuum of practices to determine whether or not owners simply control just the
location, display or prominence of users’ content.70 Or, stated another way,
courts evaluate an array of activities to assess whether “internet service providers” create and publish “new” content—before deciding whether to immunize companies from users’ and third parties’ lawsuits.71
Ranging from very minimum to substantial interferences, the following
continuum comprises the universe of tech companies’ allegedly unfair and
62.

See, e.g., Laura Wong, Nine Types of Social Media and How Each Can Benefit
Your Business, HOOTSUITE (Sept. 2, 2021), https://blog.hootsuite.com/types-ofsocial-media/ [https://perma.cc/6A2N-8T9U]; Garima Kakkar, What Are the
Different Types of Social Media?, DIGITAL VIDYA, https://
www.digitalvidya.com/blog/types-of-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/N8L3EUB3] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).

63. Wong, supra note 62; Kakkar, supra note 62.
64.

The 7 Different Types of Social Media, supra note 16.

65.

Id.

66.

Id.

67.

Id.

68.

Id.

69.

See Pace v. Baker-White, 432 F. Supp. 3d 495, 503–04 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (reaffirming that CDA section 230 immunizes “internet service providers” rather
than “content providers” from liability and reporting that platform providers’
levels of editorial controls appear along a continuum, “ranging from merely
hosting, curating, or positioning content [to] editing, . . .framing, and creating
content.”).

70.

Id.

71.

Id.
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controversial practices: (1) hosting or republishing users’ content;72 (2) curating, selecting and excluding users’ content;73 (3) positioning, increasing or
decreasing the prominence of content providers’ information;74 (4) judging,
editing or modifying users’ content;75 (5) soliciting and retaining editorial
control over content creators’ information;76 (6) adding commentary or deleting users’ comments or posts;77 and (7) intentionally and materially creating,
providing and/or assembling content to generate sales and profit.78
Generally, under the CDA, tech companies are not publishers or content
creators, if they merely host or republish users’ content.79 Contrarily, courts
are more likely to declare that tech companies are content providers, if those
entities create, assemble, and/or display content to generate profits.80 However, whether tech companies are platform providers—when they engage in
72.

See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 137–40 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (concluding that the defendant was immune from liability).

73.

See Reit v. Yelp! Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 412–13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (immunizing Yelp! against a dentist’s defamation claims, where the site had selectively removed positive reviews, but inserted negative reviews of the dentist’s
practice).

74.

See Small Just. LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 2014 WL 1214828, at *7–8
(D. Mass. 2014) (concluding that Xcentric’s attempt to increase the prominence
of its site among retrieved listings on Google’s search did not make Xcentric a
content provider), aff’d, 873 F.3d 313 (1st Cir. 2017).

75.

See Dimeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 527 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (declaring that
defendant was immune even though he selected, removed, and altered thirdparty posts or content on his message boards), aff’d, 248 F. App’x 280 (3d Cir.
2007).

76.

See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49–53 (D.D.C. 1998) (concluding
that defendants were immune even though they selected, edited, and published
the users’ content); See also Obado v. Magedson, 612 F. App’x 90, 93 (3d Cir.
2015); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1120–24 (9th Cir.
2003).

77.

See Shiamili v. Real Est. Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1019 (N.Y.
2011) (granting immunity where defendants added a non-defamatory headline
to objectionable third-party posts).

78.

See Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 742 (7th Cir. 2016) (declaring that
Gawker—an online tabloid—was a “content provider” and not immune under
CDA section 230 after Gawker encouraged its employees to post comments on
the site about a sexual-assault acquittee, just to drive online traffic); Fair Hous.
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1166–67 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the website created allegedly defamatory
content by soliciting and assembling users’ preferences, applying a “material
contribution or collaborative” test, and declaring that the website’s owner was
not immune from liability).

79.

See Pace, v. Baker-White, 432 F. Supp. 3d 495, 503–06 (E.D. Pa. 2020).

80.

Id.
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other practices—has generated severe judicial splits.81 Below, the discussion
addresses the more narrow question of whether social media companies are
content creators when they intentionally and actively solicit, select, evaluate,
edit or add commentary to users’ content.82
III. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND THE
PURPORTED SCOPE OF SOCIAL MEDIA OWNERS’
IMMUNITY FROM LAWSUITS
A.

Brief Overview: The Communications Decency Act’s Purpose and
Standards

In 1996, Congress revised the Telecommunication Act.83 The revisions
included the CDA, excerpted in 47 U.S.C. § 230, and was fashioned to prevent minors from accessing or reviewing indecent material on the Internet.84
Although the Supreme Court declared that certain sections of the CDA violated the free-speech prong of the First Amendment, section 230(c) was not
disturbed.85 Debatably, the CDA has only two safe harbor provisions.86 One
immunes internet service providers from users’ direct-liability lawsuits; and,
the other clause immunes social media providers from secondary-liability
lawsuits.87
1.

Section 230(c)(1) and the Scope of Platform Providers’
Immunity

The controversial and highly litigated section 230(c)(1)88 reads in relevant part: “No provider . . . of an interactive computer service shall be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”89 Or, stated differently, a social media provider is not
81.

Id. at 505 (“In some cases, defendants engage in editing or make editorial judgments, which triggers arguments about what constitutes content editing versus
content creation.” (emphasis added)).

82.

See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51–52 (D.D.C. 1998) (stressing
that section 230 provides “immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive role in making available content prepared
by others.” (emphasis added)).

83. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 223, 230).
84.

See id.

85.

See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 857–58, 882–886 (1997).

86. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
87.

Id.

88. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
89.

Id.

2021]

Abolishing Communications Decency Act Sanitize

271

a “publisher” of any content, if a third party—user, commentator, agent, consumer, freelance author or speaker—provides the content.90
Why did Congress enact section 230(c)(1)—a safe-harbor defense provision?91 During the Internet’s early development, any person could be directly or secondarily liable for defamation, if he or she knowingly or
unknowingly published harmful speech on websites.92 Thus, for economic
and other rational reasons,93 Congress decided to treat social media providers
unlike the owners of mainstream media.94 Then, as now, owners of newspapers, magazines, television and radio stations will be vicariously liable, if (1)
the owners publish or distribute users’ or freelance writers’ obscene or defamatory words, and (2) the tortious words injure a third party.95
Without doubt, the federal circuits and state courts are remarkably divided over whether section 230(c)(1) gives platform providers “broad immunity” against all common-law and statutory lawsuits, if social media users’,
subscribers’, employees’ or agents’ content injure third-party claimants.96 To
illustrate, the First, Fourth and Tenth Circuits have declared that section
230(c)(1) creates federal immunity against any cause of action that would
make service providers responsible for content creators’ tortious conduct.97
The Seventh Circuit, however, has repeatedly rejected or questioned the pro-

90.

See id.

91.

See generally id.

92.

See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *6–7
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (allowing the plaintiff to advance a vicarious
liability action against Prodigy after a third party posted an allegedly libelous
statement about the plaintiff on Prodigy’s electronic bulletin boards).

93.

See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b); see generally Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027 (“Congress
wanted to encourage the unfettered and unregulated development of free
speech on the Internet, and to promote the development of e-commerce.”).

94. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998).
95.

Id.

96.

Infra notes 97–98.

97.

See Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir.
2007) (declaring that section 230 immunity should be broadly construed);
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328–30 (4th Cir. 1997) (declaring
that section 230 immunes platform providers from liability—under any cause
of action— if content providers are liable); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am.
Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984–85 (10th Cir. 2000) (same); see also E-Ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-646-FtM-PAM-CM, 2017
WL 2210029, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017) (reaffirming that the CDA section
230(c)(1) provides general immunity from social-media lawsuits).
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position that section 230(c)(1) provides broad immunity for social media
companies.98
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s contradictory
opinions have only exacerbated the confusion.99 In Batzel v. Smith100 and
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.,101 the Ninth Circuit concluded that section 230(c)(1)
does not create “broad immunity” for platform providers.102 However, in
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC,103
the Ninth Circuit declared section 230(c)(1) grants general immunity from
secondary liability.104
2.

Section 230(c)(2)(A) and the Stated Scope of Providers’
Immunity

Now, consider the CDA’s second safe harbor clause—section
230(c)(2)(A).105 It reads in relevant part: “No provider . . . of an interactive
computer service shall be . . . liable [for voluntarily acting] in good faith [and
restricting persons’] access to. . .obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable [material, even if] such material is constitutionally protected.”106

98.

See Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (questioning whether
section 230(c)(1) creates any form of immunity); Chi. Laws.’ Comm. for C.R.
Under L., Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669–71 (7th Cir. 2008) (same);
City of Chi. v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010) (declaring
that section 230(c)(1) does not create immunity of any kind).

99.

See generally Batzel, 333 F.3d 1018; Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096
(9th Cir. 2009); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

100. 333 F.3d at 1018.
101. 570 F.3d at 1096.
102. See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 n.19; Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100 (“Looking at the
text [of subsection (c)(1)], it appears clear that neither this subsection nor any
other declares a general immunity from liability deriving from third-party
content . . . .”).
103. 521 F.3d 1157.
104. Id. at 1170–71 (stressing that any activity or question—involving whether to
exclude third parties’ online post or material—is perforce immune under section 230); see also Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376,
389–90 (2006) (declaring that immunity under section 230 applies to a variety
of tort claims).
105. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
106. Id. (emphasis added).
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Unlike section 230(c)(1)’s purportedly “broad immunity” protection,
section 230(c)(2)(A) provides only limited immunity against a lawsuit.107
Therefore, dissatisfied content creators or third-party plaintiffs may file direct actions against tech companies—without worrying excessively about
whether the CDA will preempt their lawsuits.108 And tech companies will be
directly liable, if they failed to employ good-faith practices when moderating
allegedly objectionable, harassing, or excessively violent content.109
Regrettably, section 230 does not define “good faith,” “lascivious,” “objectionable,” and other important terms.110 But even more regrettably, sections 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2)(A) do not state affirmatively the types of
circumstances under which social media companies could be directly or secondarily liable for tort-based, contract-based or statutory violations.111 Therefore, as discussed below, sections 230(c)(1), 230(c)(2)(A) and 230(f)(3) have
generated serious judicial splits, surrounding the scope of social media companies’ immunity against direct- and secondary-liability lawsuits.112

107. See E-Ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 2:14–cv–646–FtM–
PAM–CM, 2017 WL 2210029, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017) (reaffirming that
the CDA section 230(c)(2) provides “specific immunity” against social-media
lawsuits (emphasis added)).
108. See id. (“If [a] publisher’s motives are irrelevant and always immunized by
[section 230](c)(1), then [section 230](c)(2) is unnecessary. [Courts are] unwilling to read the statute in a way that renders the good-faith requirement
superfluous.” (emphasis added)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at *2 (accepting the argument that good faith is a question of fact). Compare
e360Insight, LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 605, 607–08 (N.D. Ill.
2008) (embracing the view that spam is objectionable content and stressing that
a subjective test must be applied to determine whether social media content is
“otherwise objectionable”), with Song fi Inc. v. Google, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d
876, 884 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (refusing to adopt YouTube’s completely subjective
reading of “otherwise objectionable” and embracing the term’s ordinary meaning in light of the Communications Decency Act’s context, history, and
purpose).
111. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)–(2)(A).
112. Infra Part III.
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CONFLICTING SAFE-HARBOR RULINGS—SECONDARYLIABILITY ACTIONS AND THE SCOPE OF SOCIAL
MEDIA COMPANIES’ IMMUNITY UNDER
CDA §§ 230(C)(1) AND 230(F)(3)

Generally, secondary liability is a common-law, tort-based principle.113
Under certain conditions, an individual may be secondarily liable for another
individual’s intentional and tortious conduct.114 Or, stated another way, an
otherwise “innocent” actor may be liable for a “deviant” actor’s tortious conduct under common-law and statutory vicarious-liability theories.115 In addition, to determine whether the CDA sections 230(c)(1) and 230(f)(3) preempt
users’ secondary-liability lawsuits, courts have fashioned and applied competing theories—the encouragement of content development theory,116 the
inducement of illegal content test,117 the material content contribution test,118
and the revenue-sharing, aiding and abetting doctrine.119 Put simply, these
latter doctrines have spawned an extraordinary amount of confusion and a
patchwork of conflicting judicial decisions.120
A.

Judicial Conflict—The Scope of Social Media Entities’ Immunity
Under Common-Law and Statutory Vicarious Liability
Theories

Theoretically, the CDA section 230(c)(1) completely shelters social media companies from secondary-liability claims, when content creators’ intentional torts injure third-party claimants.121 But should section 230(c)(1)
113. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 69 (5th ed.
1984); see also Sverker K. Högberg, The Search for Intent-Based Doctrines of
Secondary Liability in Copyright Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 914 (2006).
114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
1979).

OF

TORTS § 876, cmt. b, illus. 4 (AM. L. INST.

115. See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine:
The Divergent Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright
Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1366 (2006) (discussing the doctrines of
vicarious liability and contributory liability); see generally infra Part III
(A)–(C) and accompanying text.
116. Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 115; see also Jones v. Dirty World Ent.
Recordings LLC (Jones V), 755 F.3d 398, 412–14 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining
the “encouragement test of immunity” or the “encouragement theory of
development”).
117. Jones V, 755 F.3d at 412–14.
118. Id.
119. See infra Part III (C).
120. See infra Part III.
121. See, e.g., Jones V, 755 F.3d at 407 (stressing that at its core, section 230 immunizes service providers from “publisher-liability and notice-liability defama-
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totally immune platform providers from secondary-liability claims, if companies actively and intentionally encourage content providers to develop, create
or display allegedly tortious information?122 This narrow question has produced not only a substantial amount of debate among critics and users but
also between mainstream and social media owners.123 This question has also
spawned an extraordinary amount of confusion and conflicting decisions
among federal courts,124 as well as between state and federal courts.125
Arguably, case-specific facts and courts’ selective application of the
above-mentioned secondary-liability doctrines have fostered the split rulings
surroundings the scope of platform providers’ immunity under section
230(c)(1).126 Thus, reconsider the common-law doctrine of vicarious lability.127 Generally, corporate or business entities are not vicariously liable for
their agents or employees’ intentional torts—verbal assaults, defamatory
statements, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, trespass, con-

tion” lawsuits when providers “publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content,”
and provides protection against litigation costs, potential liability and litigants
who “would chill free speech”).
122. See infra note 123 and accompanying discussion.
123. See generally Yaël Eisenstat, How to Hold Social Media Accountable for
Undermining Democracy, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 11, 2021), https://hbr.org/
2021/01/how-to-hold-social-media-accountable-for-undermining-democracy
[https://perma.cc/8L7V-78SL] (“The storming of the U.S. Capitol Building . . .
by a mob of Trump insurrectionists was shocking. . . . [T]the biggest social
media companies—[including] Facebook—are absolutely complicit. [The
companies allowed] an insurrection to be planned and promoted on their
platforms.” (emphasis added)); Facebook Is Complicit in Deadly Kenosha
Shootings for Failing to Block Online Hate Group, COLOR OF CHANGE (Aug.
26, 2020), https://colorofchange.org/press_release/color-of-change-facebookis-complicit-in-deadly-kenosha-shootings-for-failing-to-block-online-hategroup/ [https://perma.cc/ES28-QNS6] (alleging that “Facebook knowingly
allowed the . . . Kenosha Guard to use the social media platform to encourage
an armed response to protests in Kenosha, Wisconsin . . . .” (emphasis added));
Barbara Ortutay & Tali Arbel, Social Media Platforms Face a Reckoning Over
Hate Speech, AP NEWS (June 29, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/
6d0b3359ee5379bd5624c9f1024a0eaf [https://perma.cc/W7DS-K3T6] (“For
years, social media platforms have . . . hosted an explosion of hate speech. . . .
[Recently], the Trump Reddit forum . . . was banned because it encouraged
violence.” (emphasis added)).
124. See supra note 123 and accompanying text; infra notes 128–184 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 128–184 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 134–184 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 128–134 and accompanying text.
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version or the misappropriation of third parties’ property.128 However, corporate entities are vicariously liable, if they control or receive pecuniary
benefits from their agents’, servants’ or employees’ tortious conduct.129
On the other hand, under various statutory doctrines of vicarious liability,130 a corporate entity is vicariously liable, only if the entity (1) intentionally encourages, induces, promotes or facilitates a tortfeasor’s invasive
conduct;131 (2) refuses to terminate or restrict the offensive conduct;132 and
(3) profits financially and vicariously from the tortfeasor’s conduct.133 Generally, under the latter theories, the scope of a principal’s “control” is not a
relevant element.134
Perhaps, state and federal courts should always apply a statutory vicarious-liability doctrine rather than the common-law doctrine to determine
whether tech companies are secondarily liable. Why? Section 230(c)(1) does
not create an employer-employee, a principal-agent, or a master-servant relationship between social media providers and content creators.135 Thus,
128. See Auer v. Paliath, 17 N.E.3d 561, 565–66 (Ohio 2014) (outlining commonlaw rules and reaffirming that a master is vicarious liable if an agent’s or servant’s intentional tort facilitates or promotes the master’s business).
129. Id.
130. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982) (stressing
that a contributory infringement theory requires proof of an intent to induce
another to infringe a trademark or a contributory infringer’s continuing to supply goods or services to a known tortfeasor who infringes on a trademark);
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261–64 (9th Cir. 1996)
(citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
434–35 (1984)) (explaining that vicarious liability may be imposed in virtually
all areas of law, reaffirming that statutory doctrines of secondary liability
emerged from common law principles, and stressing that a party who provides
a forum and facilitates a third-party seller’s copyright infringement may be
vicariously liable).
131. See Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
936–41, 938 n.12, (2005) (carving out an exception to a “safe harbor” rule for
persons who intentionally distribute a copyright-infringement product and
holding that vicarious liability may arise from [one] actively encouraging a
third party to use a product for an infringing purpose. “[One who clearly and
affirmatively] distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe [a] copyright . . . is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third
parties.” (emphasis added)).
132. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir.
1963).
133. Id.
134. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261–64; Metro, 545 U.S. at 936–41; Shapiro, 316
F.2d at 307.
135. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2003) (stressing that the
proper focus of an analysis under section 230(c)(1) is whether a tech company

2021]

Abolishing Communications Decency Act Sanitize

277

courts’ deciding whether tech companies “control” users’ purportedly injurious content should rarely be the focus of an inquiry.136 Yet, judicial splits
have emerged when state and federal courts apply a statutory vicarious-liability doctrine to resolve disputes involving a secondary-liability claim, which
is coupled with a federal-preemption defense.137 Why? Some courts have applied inappropriately and injudiciously common-law, agency, master-servant
and control principles to decide the disagreements.138
To illustrate, under the common law, a principal exercises control over a
tortfeasor and his conduct, only if (1) the tortfeasor is a servant or an agent,
and (2) the principal has a legal right as well as the ability to stop or limit the
servants’ or agents’ tortious conduct.139 Curiously, federal courts in California, Idaho, Texas, and Virginia have allowed third parties to commence lawsuits against social media providers, who failed to control the tortious
activities of non-servants and non-agents—”subscribers,”140 “unpaid forum
moderators,”141 “forum moderators”142 and “advertisers.”143 Also, an Illinois
is a provider of an interactive computer service as defined in section 230(f)(2)
of the statute); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05CV91, 2006 WL 8440858, at
*10 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2006) (stressing that the proper analysis focuses on
whether an information content provider—as defined in section 230(f)(3)—
provided the allegedly tortious information).
136. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030–31; Doe, 2006 WL 8440858 at *10.
137. See infra notes 140–144, 146–149 and accompanying discussion.
138. See infra notes 140–143 and accompanying discussion.
139. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1171–73 (9th Cir.
2007) (declaring that a defendant—who has not directly infringed on a copyright—may be liable for contributory infringement if the defendant (1) has
knowledge of another’s infringing conduct, and (2) induces, causes, or materially contributes to that conduct); Id. at 1173–75; see also
Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 n.9
(2005) (concluding a defendant’s right and ability to supervise a direct infringer determines the presence or absence of “control” under a common-law
vicarious liability test).
140. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., No. CV11–07098 AHM (SHx), 2013
WL 2109963, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2013) (declaring that plaintiff satisfied
the “control” element and stated a claim for vicarious liability against
Giganews for copyright infringement committed by Giganews’ subscribers).
141. See Cornelius v. Deluca, No. 1:10–cv–027–BLW, 2010 WL 4923030, at *4
(D. Idaho Nov. 29, 2010) (holding that plaintiffs state a cognizable vicarious
liability claim if they allege in good faith that: (1) the forum moderator was the
platform provider’s agent or representative, (2) the provider knew that the moderator posted disparaging comments about the third party’s products, (3) the
platform provider knew the forum moderator made and posted the comments,
and (4) the provider unreasonably failed to remove the comments).
142. See Wiswell v. VerticalScope, Inc., No. A-11-CA-737-SS, 2012 WL
13136295, at *1–5 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2012) (noting that the litigants disputed
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court permitted a negligent supervision cause of action to advance against a
platform operator who failed to stop an unsupervised employee’s harmful
conduct.144
But, other federal courts in California as well as in Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin have applied a common-law control theory and declared
that section 230(c)(1) shields platform providers from statutory vicariousliability claims.145 These latter courts, however, have given varying and
thought-provoking explanations: (1) the platform provider and Californiabased “online moderator” did not form a principal-agent relationship;146 (2)
Google and its infringing advertisers did not exercise joint control over the
Virginia-based company’s products;147 (3) Yahoo! did not wield any control
over its subscribers’ websites when the subscribers allegedly used the complainant’s name without permission;148 and (4) eBay did not exercise any
control over a book publishing company, that allegedly sold a prisoner’s
book and violated the author’s intellectual property rights.149
whether the platform provider paid the forum moderator, but allowing the vicarious liability claim because the moderator was provider’s agent or employee
who had “authority” to ban users, enforce forum rules, and regulate the forum).
143. See GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705 (E.D. Va. 2004) (applying principal-agent theory of liability, finding that Overture and the advertisers
control the appearance of advertisements on Overture’s page and concluding
that GEICO stated a claim for vicarious infringement against Overture).
144. Cf. Lansing v. Sw. Airlines Co., 980 N.E.2d 630, 636–41 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)
(declaring that Southwest is an “interactive computer service provider” and allowing the third-party aggrievant’s negligent supervision cause of action to
proceed in light of the employee’s apparent authority as well as threatening and
harassing misconduct).
145. See infra notes 146–148.
146. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that a California-based nonprofit Network could not be vicariously liable for a moderator’s allegedly offensive comments).
147. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 165 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143,
1150 (7th Cir. 1992)) (finding that the social-media company and third parties
did form an apparent or actual partnership and rejecting plaintiff’s vicarious
liability trademark infringement theory).
148. See Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 873, 885 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (citing
Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1150)) (finding that Yahoo! and the infringers did not
have an apparent or actual partnership and precluding the computer service
provider’s secondary liability under a vicarious liability or contributory infringement theory).
149. See Casterlow-Bey v. eBay, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-05687-RJB, 2017 WL 6733724,
at *6 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 29, 2017) (concluding that plaintiff failed to satisfy the
“first sale doctrine,” thereby precluding the need to decide whether the CDA
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Judicial Conflicts—The Scope of Platform Providers’ Immunity
Under the Material Contribution Test and the “Hybrid”
Content Development and Encouragement Doctrine

Once more, section 230(c)(1) shields platform owners from secondaryliability lawsuits, if social media creators’ or users’ allegedly tortious comments harm third parties.150 Nevertheless, section 230(f)(3) contains an implied “development” exception or provision: a platform owner qualifies as an
“information content provider” and becomes potentially liable if the owner
develops tortious content.151
Without doubt, the implied “content development” exception has engendered several challenging questions: Does YouTube morph into an “information content provider” if YouTube simply encourages its users to develop
allegedly tortious content?152 Do Yelp! and TripAdvisor become content creators if they merely encourage users to craft and post highly offensive reviews on the companies’ social-review sites?153 Should eBay evade
secondary liability if the company intentionally develops algorithms which
encourage users’ discriminatory pricing and sales?154 Should Facebook elude
secondary liability if the company’s intentionally modified content-moderation algorithms encourage users to develop injurious content?155
First, what is the “content development” test?156 To uncover the answer,
consider the social-media dispute and litigants in Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC (Jones III).157 Sarah Jones is a resident of Kensection 230 (c)(1) preempted plaintiff’s contributory-liability, copyright-infringement claims against eBay).
150. See, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250,
258 (4th Cir. 2009) (interpreting section 230 and defeating third parties’ efforts
to secure secondary liability damages from a website owner); DiMeo v. Max,
248 F. App’x 280, 281–82 (3d Cir. 2007) (declaring that the owner of a website message board was not liable for offensive third-party comment).
151. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
152. See infra Part III (C) and accompanying text.
153. See generally Reit v. Yelp! Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 414–15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2010) (immunizing Yelp! against a dentist’s defamation claims, where the site
had selectively removed positive reviews, but inserted negative reviews of the
dentist’s practice).
154. See generally Casterlow-Bey, 2017 WL 6733724, at *6 (refusing to decide
whether the CDA section 230(c)(1) preempted plaintiff’s contributory-liability,
copyright-infringement claims against eBay).
155. See infra Part III(C) and accompanying text.
156. See Jones V, 755 F.3d 398, 413 (6th Cir. 2014) (discussing the material contribution test).
157. Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC (Jones III), 840 F. Supp.
2d 1008 (E.D. Ky. 2012). It is important to stress that the dispute between
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tucky.158 She is also a former teacher and an ex-member of the Cincinnati
BenGals—the cheerleading squad for the Cincinnati Bengals.159 Dirty World,
LLC owned and Nik Lamas-Richie managed the infamous
www.TheDirty.com website.160 Simply put, Richie encouraged visitors and
users to upload anonymous comments, photographs, and videos.161 Afterwards, Richie selected, edited and published certain comments.162
In the course of events, an anonymous user posted a negative comment
about Jones on the website.163 Richie refused to remove the assertedly tortious post.164 In response, Sarah sued Dirty World and Richie in the District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.165 She raised multiple tort-based
claims: defamation, libel per se, false light, and the intentional infliction of
emotional distress.166 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
the CDA section 230(c)(1) barred the claims.167 To reach a decision, the district court reexamined the language in section 230(f)(3) and fashioned a twopronged “encouragement theory of development.”168 The theory asserts: A
website owner becomes a “content creator or developer” and secondarily liable if (1) the owner intentionally encourages or invites a third party to post
illegal, invidious or tortious comments, and (2) the owner ratifies, adopts or
embellishes the third party’s comments.169
Applying the rule, the district court rejected the defendants’ motion to
dismiss.170 Ultimately, a jury decided in favor of Sarah.171 Dirty World and
Richie appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.172 To interpret the
meaning of “development” in section 230(f)(3), the appellate court rejected
the district court’s encouragement of development test and applied the Ninth
Sarah Jones and Dirty World has a long procedural history, generating five
reported decisions.
158. Jones III, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1009–10.
159. Id.
160. Jones V, 755 F.3d at 402–03.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Jones III, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1009–10.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Jones V, 755 F.3d at 402.
167. Id.
168. Jones IV, 965 F. Supp. 2d 818, 821 (E.D. Ky. 2013).
169. Id. at 821–22.
170. Id. at 823.
171. Jones V, 755 F.3d at 402.
172. Id.
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Circuit’s material contribution test.173 Under the latter doctrine, an otherwise
“innocent” website owner becomes responsible and liable for developing
content, only if the owner materially contributes to illegal behavior.174
In the end, the Sixth Circuit accepted the defendants’ argument and declared that section 230(c)(1) barred Jones’s claims.175 Still, the Sixth Circuit
presented a highly questionable explanation for rejecting the district court’s
novel test.176 It reads:
An encouragement test would inflate the meaning of “development.” . . . Many websites . . . encourage users to post particular
types of content. . . . Under an encouragement test of development
. . . websites would lose the immunity [defense] . . . and be subject
to hecklers’ suits. . . . Moreover, under the district court’s rule,
courts would . . . have to decide what constitutes “encouragement” . . . [which] is certainly more difficult to define. . . . [T]he
muddiness of an encouragement rule would cloud [matters].177
Perhaps, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis and conclusion are less-than-persuasive, because the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and
Tenth Circuits have explicitly rejected the notion that section 230 unequivocally bars secondary liability lawsuits.178 Moreover, the same federal appellate courts have given lower courts unequivocal discretion to apply a
“content inducement theory” when deciding section 230 preemption disputes.179 Briefly put, under the latter test, a social media owner is secondarily
liable for inducing a content provider to create or post illegal content.180
173. Id. at 413.
174. See id. at 413–16.
175. Id. at 417.
176. Id. at 414–15 (emphasis added).
177. Jones V, 755 F.3d at 414–15 (emphasis added).
178. See, e.g., Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 421 (1st
Cir. 2007); DiMeo v. Max, 248 Fed. App’x 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2007); Nemet
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 257 (4th Cir.
2009); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420–22 (5th Cir. 2008); Chi.
Laws.’ Comm. for C.R. Under L., Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671–72
(7th Cir. 2008); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2010); Fair
Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); F.T.C. v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d
1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009).
179. See, e.g., Universal Commc’n, 478 F.3d at 421; DiMeo, 248 Fed. App’x at 282;
Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 257; Doe, 528 F.3d at 420–22; Chi. Laws.’
Comm., 519 F.3d at 671–72; Johnson, 614 F.3d at 792; Fair Hous. Council,
521 F.3d at 1175; Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199.
180. See, e.g., Universal Commc’n, 478 F.3d at 421; DiMeo, 248 Fed. App’x at 282;
Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 257; Doe, 528 F.3d at 420–22; Chi. Laws.’
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Therefore, arguably, the encouragement theory of development test and the
content inducement test are the same theory.181 Why? Courts in the Sixth
Circuit182 and numerous federal appellate courts183 have used encouraging
and inducing, as well as encouragement and inducement, interchangeably—
finding no material or legal distinction between the synonyms.
Conceivably, unless Congress clarifies or repeals section 230(f)(3), the
troublesome “development of information” phrase184 will continue to produce uncertainty and judicial splits surrounding three questions: (1) whether
a social media entity is secondarily liable for actively and intentionally encouraging creators to post already developed and illegal content on the entity’s platform;185 (2) whether a platform provider is secondarily liable for
Comm., 519 F.3d at 671–72; Johnson, 614 F.3d at 792; Fair Hous. Council,
521 F.3d at 1175; Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199.
181. See infra notes 182–183 and accompanying text.
182. See e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
930 (2005) (“One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement . . . .”); Mich. Motor Techs. LLC v. Volkswagen
Aktiengesellschaft, 472 F. Supp. 3d 377, 386 (E.D. Mich. 2021) (embracing the
proposition that absent an affirmative act of encouragement, a party may not be
charged with inducement).
183. Geophysical Serv., Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 850 F.3d 785, 798
(5th Cir. 2017) (embracing the proposition that absent an affirmative act of
encouragement, a party may not be charged with inducement); Luvdarts, LLC
v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 710 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013); Sanofi v. Watson Labs. Inc., 875 F.3d 636, 646 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The evidence . . . supports
the finding of intentional encouragement of infringing use and, therefore, of
inducement.”). Substantially more support for this assertion emerged after
searching Westlaw’s “FedCtApp” database and submitting the query: adv: (inducement inducing /s encouragement encouraging) % criminal crime.
184. See Jones V, 755 F.3d 398, 409 (6th Cir. 2014) (embracing the views that (1)
an overly inclusive interpretation of “development” in section 230(f)(3) would
impose secondary liability on website operator for merely displaying or allowing one to access content that a third party developed; and (2) a very broad
reading of “development” would defeat the CDA’s purposes and swallow section 230’s core immunity protection).
185. See Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 560 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (stressing
that a website owner who encourages the publication of unlawful material does
not expose the owner to legal action); DiMeo, 248 F. App’x at 281 (affirming
the lower court’s holding that a website’s owner who hosted allegedly defamatory material was entitled to section 230(c)(1) immunity); S.C. v. Dirty World
LLC, No. 11–CV–00392–DW, 2012 WL 3335284, at *4–5 (W.D. Mo. Mar.
12, 2012) (holding that an entity’s mere encouragement of defamatory posts is
insufficient to defeat CDA immunity); Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842
F. Supp. 2d 450, 475–76 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (concluding that the website did not
lose immunity for encouraging consumers to post negative comments); Glob.
Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (D. Ariz.
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intentionally encouraging content creators to develop “new” and illegal content;186 and (3) whether a company is secondarily liable for constructing or
modifying a social media platform, which encourages or induces third parties
to post offensive content.187
C.

Judicial Conflicts—The Scope of Social Media Companies’
Immunity Under Federal Aiding and Abetting Statutes

The doctrine of aiding and abetting is a “well-known and well-defined”
secondary liability theory.188 Stated briefly, aiding-and-abetting liability may
arise under federal and state common law.189 Under federal tort law, a person
becomes an aider and abettor as well as secondarily liable, if (1) a principal
commits a “wrongful act that causes an injury”; (2) the aider and abettor had
general knowledge about the principal’s illegality or tortious activity; and (3)
the aider and abettor provided substantial assistance— which helped the principal to commit the wrongful act.190 Under state common law, a complainant

2008) (holding that operator of consumer review website did not lose section
230(c)(1) immunity simply for encouraging third parties to post defamatory
content).
186. Compare Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (declaring that section
230 provided no immunity against secondary-liability lawsuit for a website operator who encourages the development of offensive content); Fair Hous.
Council, 521 F.3d at 1164–65.; and Jones III, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1010–13
(E.D. Ky. 2012), with Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124
(9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that a service provider was immune from liability
after fashioning dating-service profiles, a questionnaire and encouraging posters to create all assertedly offensive content).
187. Compare Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a
website operator may be deprived of immunity if the operator “designs” its
website to be a portal for defamatory material), with M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. Vill.
Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 2011)
(deciding that a website operator does lose its immunity merely because the
website’s construction and operation might encourage or influence offensive
third-party postings) (quoting Goddard v. Google, No. C 08-2738 JF (PVT),
2008 WL 5245490, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2008)).
188. See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002); see
also Morganroth & Morganroth v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, P.C., 331
F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2003); Decker v. SEC, 631 F.2d 1380, 1387–88 (10th
Cir. 1980).
189. See, e.g., Stutts v. De Dietrich Grp., No. 03-CV-4058 (ILG), 2006 WL
1867060, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2006); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Giacomi, 659
A.2d 1166, 1178 n.28 (Conn. 1995) (stressing that tort principles of aider and
abettor liability already exist under state common law).
190. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477–78 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (AM. L. INST. 1977)).
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must prove fairly similar elements to prevail in an aiding-and-abetting
action.191
To be sure, Congress has enacted numerous criminal aiding-and-abetting statutes.192 In recent years, disgruntled Americans as well as congressional members have alleged that the owners of Google, Facebook, Twitter
and other large platforms violate aiding-and-abetting statutes by helping domestic and international “criminals” to commit exceedingly serious crimes.193
Some complainants have tried to sue large tech companies. However, appellate courts are divided over the question of whether the CDA section 230
prevents victims, survivors, and estates from suing social media entities for
violating certain aiding-and-abetting statutes.
For example, as the Author was penning this Article, the Ninth Circuit
delivered an extremely long and thoughtful aiding-and-abetting opinion in
The Estate of Nohemi Gonzalez v. Google, LLC.194 Arguably, the opinion will
prove to be newsworthy and highly educational. Why? In Nohemi as well as
in Force v. Facebook, Inc.,195 the underlying facts, aiding-and-abetting
claims, and CDA-preemption disputes are nearly identical. Yet, the Second
and Ninth Circuits’ preemption analyses and conclusions deviated
substantially.
First, consider the aiding-and-abetting statutes and relevant facts in
Force. In 1990, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA).196 The act

191. See, e.g., Casey v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401, 405 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2005) (reaffirming that secondary liability may be imposed “if the person
(a) knows the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial
assistance . . . or (b) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a
tortious result and the person’s own conduct . . . constitutes a breach of duty to
the third person.”) (quoting Fiol v. Doellstedt 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 312
(1996)).
192. See United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) (outlining the
history of early common law and aiding and abetting statutes); David D.
Dodge, Clients and Their Creditors, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Mar. 2004 at 10, 11 (listing
numerous federal aiding and abetting statutes involving concealment of assets,
18 U.S.C. § 152; bankruptcy fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 157; and the fraudulent transfer of debts, 28 U.S.C. § 3304).
193. See generally MacCarthy, supra note 48 (discussing CDA reforms which will
impose secondary liability on social-media companies who aid and abet persons who commit acts of international terrorism); Feiner, supra note 44 (showing that, in general, Democrats are most concerned about getting big social
media companies to take down terrorism-related content, and that Republicans
allege social media companies censor conservative viewpoints).
194. 2021 WL 2546675, at *879 (9th Cir. June 22, 2021).
195. 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019).
196. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 1-1-519, § 132, 104 Stat. 2240 (1990)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a)).
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imposes liability if a person materially supports “terrorism,”197 gives resources to a “foreign terrorist organization,”198 and conceals the support or
resources.199 In 2016, Congress enacted the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA).200 Stated briefly, JASTA amended the ATA by adding
section 2333(a), which imposes civil liability for one’s aiding and abetting
“terrorism.”201 Under JASTA, an “American national” may commence a lawsuit “in any appropriate district court of the United States” if an “act of international terrorism” injures a national or her estate, survivors, or heirs.202 And,
if the national prevails, she shall recover damages, and costs and attorney’s
fees.203
Between 2014 and 2016, a “designated foreign terrorist organization”
killed Taylor Force and four other American nationals who were visiting a
“foreign country.”204 The alleged foreign criminals posted content on
“Facebook’s foreign facilities,” which were “located outside the United
States.”205 In the course of events, the deceased victims’ surviving relatives
and estates sued Facebook.206 The complaint was filed in the District Court
for the Eastern District of New York.207
Among other claims, the Force survivors alleged Facebook was civilly
and secondarily liable under JASTA sections 2339A and 2339B for aiding
and abetting a “foreign terrorist organization.”208 More precisely, the survivors argued that Facebook’s “advertising algorithms and remarketing technology” allowed Facebook and the paramilitary group to generate and share
revenues.209 Therefore, allegedly, the funds materially helped the “terrorist
organization” to commit terroristic acts.210 Facebook moved to dismiss the
197. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
198. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
199. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C.
200. Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852
(2016) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)).
201. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2019) (disclosing that the
“terrorist organization” was the para-military wing of Hamas and the “foreign
country” was Israel).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 57.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 61 n.10.
209. Id. at 58–59.
210. Force, 934 F.3d at 58–59 (2d Cir. 2019); see also Force v. Facebook, Inc., 304
F. Supp. 3d 315, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (alleging that Facebook violated 18
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claim, asserting that the survivors and estates failed to state a cognizable
claim.211 The district court agreed, and the plaintiffs appealed.
Before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the principal question was
whether the CDA section 230(c)(1) shielded Facebook from an aiding-andabetting action.212 In the end, the Second Circuit concluded that section
230(c)(1) preempted the parents’ and relatives’ JASTA claims. The appellate
court declared that Facebook was not a publisher and did not provide any
information for the “foreign terrorists.”213 But, what about the plaintiffs’
shared-revenue, aiding-and-abetting claim? Did Facebook share profits,
which helped the paramilitary group to terrorize and murder American nationals? Regrettably, the Second Circuit did not give a thorough analysis or
persuasive answer. Instead, the appellate court gave a curt and less-than-judicious response, stating that JASTA “provides no obstacle—explicit or implicit—to applying section 230.”214
Now, consider the Estate of Nohemi, which presents markedly similar
facts, but a decidedly different preemption-immunity ruling. On November
13, 2015, a different “foreign terrorist organization” killed nineteen people
who visited a bistro in Paris, France.”215 Nohemi Gonzalez—a visiting
American citizen and university student—was one of the victims.216 Ultimately, the “Paris terrorists” posted audio and video messages on YouTube
and claimed responsibility for the attacks.217
Gonzalez’s surviving family members sued Google, Inc., who owns and
manages YouTube.218 Among multiple claims, the survivors alleged that
Google was secondarily liable for aiding and abetting Gonzalez’s murderers.219 In particular, the survivors maintained that Google violated JASTA
sections 2339A and 2339B, by knowingly sharing advertising revenue with a
“foreign terrorist organization.”220 The survivors stressed that Google (1) re-

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

U.S.C. § 2339C(c) by giving material resources to terrorist and concealing the
resources).
Force, 934 F.3d at 61.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 72.
Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1160–62 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(reporting that the “foreign terrorist organization” was the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria and the “foreign country” was France).
Id.
Id. at 1161.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1162–63 (“Plaintiffs allege that Google creates ‘new unique content’ for
viewers and earns revenue ‘by incorporating ISIS posted videos along with
advertisements.’”).
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viewed and approved the terrorists’ videos, (2) “monetized” the terrorists’
videos on YouTube, (3) derived revenue from the advertisements when users
viewed the videos, and (4) shared a percentage of the generated revenue with
the terrorist organization.221
Consequently, from the survivors’ perspective, “Google’s material support was the proximate cause of Gonzalez’s death.”222 Google filed a motion
to dismiss the aiding-and-abetting claim, arguing that section 230 of the
CDA blocked the civil action.223 Alternatively, Google argued that the survivors’ claim was insufficiently pleaded.224 The federal district court rejected
Google’s procedural defense but accepted the substantive defense.225 The
case was appealed. And a major question before the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals was whether the survivors’ JASTA action was preempted.226 The
Ninth Circuit said no, concluding that section 230 does not immunize Google
from aiding-and-abetting claims that arise from illegal revenue-sharing
activities.227
Curiously, the Nohemi court stated that the revenue-sharing dispute “appears to be one of first impression for the courts of appeal.”228 Yet, a close
reading of the facts in Force reveals that revenue-sharing liability was a central claim.229 Importantly, both Facebook and Google prevailed against the
respective survivors’ revenue-sharing claim. But even more importantly,
Facebook’s section 230 preemption defense worked. Google’s preemption
defense did not.230 Debatably, for future survivors and social media companies, the Force and Nohemi courts’ conflicting procedural rulings have
spawned more confusion surrounding a different secondary liability question:
whether the CDA section 230 immunizes tech companies from any “aiding

221. Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 335 F. Supp. at 1162.
222. Id. at 1160.
223. Id. at 1179.
224. Id.
225. Id. (concluding that the plaintiffs did not allege any direct causal connection
between the Paris attack, ISIS’s single YouTube video, and any shared revenue
between ISIS and Google).
226. Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871, 880(9th Cir. 2021).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 58–59, 61 (2d Cir. 2019).
230. Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 898–99 (concluding that section 230 does not bar the Gonzalez survivors’ aiding and abetting claims which allegedly arose from
Google’s sharing revenue with a terrorist organization— ISIS).
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and abetting terrorism” lawsuit under JASTA sections 2339A, 2339B or
§ 2339C(c).231
IV. CONFLICTING SAFE-HARBOR RULINGS—CONTRACTBASED ACTIONS AND THE SCOPE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
ENTITIES’ IMMUNITY UNDER SECTIONS
230(C)(1) AND 230(C)(2)(A)
Customarily, owners of social-networking, media-sharing, consumer-review, and video-hosting platforms require users to “accept” certain terms and
conditions which appear in online agreements.”232 For example, in Teatotaller, LLC v. Facebook, Inc.,233 the controversial terms-of-use provision stated:
You agree that we won’t be responsible . . . for any lost profits,
revenues, information, or data, or consequential, special, indirect,
exemplary, punitive, or incidental damages arising out of or related to [the Terms of Use], even if we know they are possible.
This includes when we delete your content, information, or
account.234
Generally, this type of standardized agreement is a valid and enforceable contract.235 Thus, in recent years, users and content creators have commenced numerous contract-based actions against social media companies
alleging that the platform owners breached a standardized contract, a standalone promise and/or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.236
To defend against contract-based lawsuits, tech companies have raised a
preemption-immunity defense, citing section 230(c)(1) and/or section
230(c)(2)(A) of the CDA.237 Under section 230(c)(2)(A), social media providers are generally sheltered against lawsuits. But, there is a proviso: platform owners must act in “good faith” when deciding whether to block or
231. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(c) (prohibiting the knowing concealment of “the nature,
location, source, ownership, or control” of any support, resources, or
funds. . .in violation of section 2339B.).
232. See infra notes 233–234 and accompanying text.
233. 242 A.3d 814 (N.H. 2020).
234. Id. at 819 (emphasis added).
235. Cf. id. at 816 (highlighting that a social media user’s allegation that an operator
deleted its account in violation of the terms of service was sufficient to state a
breach of contract claim).
236. See infra notes 242–268 and accompanying text.
237. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A); see also Fyk v. Facebook, Inc., 808 Fed. App’x 597,
598 (9th Cir. 2020) (rejecting the argument that granting section 230(c)(1) immunity to Facebook renders section 230(c)(2)(A) mere surplusage, reaffirming
that section 230(c)(2)(A) provides an additional shield from liability and
stressing that person who cannot take advantage of subsection (c)(1), perhaps
because they developed the content may take advantage of subsection (c)(2)).
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delete content creators’ purportedly “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable” reviews, comments or
videos.238 Certainly, some plaintiffs have filed a contract-based action alleging specifically that tech companies breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by allowing users to post or share purportedly “dangerously toxic and injurious” comments, images and videos.239
Courts generally agree that a successful CDA preemption-immunity defense does not depend upon whether a user’s or content provider’s theory of
recovery sounds in tort, contract, or equity.240 Instead, the substance of a
legal claim—rather than its label—determines whether a federal statute
preempts a state-law theory of recovery.241 Yet, after analyzing hundreds of
CDA-immunity decisions, evidence strongly suggests that some courts allow
more than the “substance of a legal claim” to shape their rulings. What is the
evidence? Consider the breach-of-contract claims in Teatotaller, Murphy v.
Twitter, Inc.242 and Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc.243 Briefly put, those decisions illustrate that state and federal courts are divided over the question of
whether sections 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2)(A) preclude certain users’ or content creators’ contract-based lawsuits.
For example, in Murphy and Schneider, the appellate courts of California and Washington declared that section 230 barred the complainants’
breach-of-contract actions.244 On the other hand, in Teatotaller, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court issued a contradiction, concluding that section
230 did not preclude the plaintiff’s litigating a breach-of-contract action

238. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A); see also Fyk, 808 Fed. App’x at 598.
239. See, e.g., Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003) (providing an
example of plaintiffs filing a breach of contract action against AOL for allegedly allowing subscribers to post defamatory information about the plaintiff).
240. See, e.g., Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 780–81
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting the argument that section 230 immunity is limited to tort claims and holding that the immunity extends to a taxpayer’s action
for declaratory and injunctive relief); see also Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d
413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008); Green, 318 F.3d at 471; Noah v. AOL Time Warner,
Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 539 (E.D. Va. 2003).
241. See, e.g., Quest Chem. Corp. v. Elam, 898 S.W.2d 819, 820–21 (Tex. 1995)
(stressing that a certain cause of action might escape preemption while a particular claim may not, since a cause of action’s name is irrelevant).
242. 274 Cal. Rptr. 3d 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021).
243. 31 P.3d 37 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
244. Murphy, 274 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 367, 369, 375 (declaring that section 230 barred
the user’s breach of contract); Schneider, 31 P.3d at 41–42 (declaring that section 230 barred the author’s breach of contract action against Amazon, for allegedly failing to remove negative reviews about the author’s book).
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against Facebook.245 Why is this split problematic? The substance of the Amazon, Facebook and Twitter contract-based claims were identical. Even more
importantly, the Supreme Courts of California, New Hampshire and Washington have embraced the same common law principles of contract.246 Yet,
these latter courts examined the same claims and delivered conflicting section 230 preemption-immunity rulings. In addition, the same breach-of-contract claim has produced a preemption-immunity conflict between the Courts
of Appeals for the Third and District of Columbia Circuits.247
As stated earlier, breach-of-promise or promissory estoppel claims have
also generated conflicting section 230 rulings.248 For instance, in Barnes v.
Yahoo!, Inc.,249 Cecilia Barnes terminated a lengthy relationship with her
boyfriend.250 In response, he fashioned and posted an unauthorized “Barnes
profile page” on Yahoo’s website, which contained implicit “sexual solicitations.” Barnes instructed Yahoo’s agent to delete the page. The agent promised that she would share the controversial statements with the appropriate
245. Teatotaller, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 242 A.3d, 814, 819 (N.H. 2020) (concluding that the allegations were sufficient to state a breach of contract claim, and
section 230(c)(1) did bar the action).
246. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 394 (Cal. 1988) (reaffirming
long-settled contract principles); In re Town of Bedford, 142 N.H. 637, 640
(1998) (reaffirming that courts must apply traditional principles of contract interpretation to determine contracting parties’ intention); Bennett Veneer Factors, Inc. v. Brewer, 441 P.2d 128, 132 (Wash. 1968) (applying general
contract principles).
247. Compare Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (concluding that section 230(C)(1) barred plaintiff’s action in part after refusing to
“transform” the plaintiff’s tort claim into a breach of contract claim), with
Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that AOL
did not waive a section 230 immunity defense and deciding that the plaintiff
failed to state viable breach of contract claim against AOL for its allegedly
failing to delete other subscribers’ defamatory chat-room statements); Compare
Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1354, with Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d
1056, 1061, 1064–66 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (dismissing a breach of contract claim
under section 230), and Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199,
1201 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (dismissing a breach of contract claim alleging that
Google’s search engine did not comport with the terms of use agreement), and
Fed. Agency of News LLC, v. Facebook, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1119–20
(N.D. Cal. 2020) (concluding that section 230(c)(1) precluded plaintiffs’ breach
of contract action).
248. See, e.g., Promissory Estoppel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(“The principle that a promise made without consideration may nonetheless be
enforced to prevent injustice if the promisor should have reasonably expected
the promisee to rely on the promise.”); Sun-Pac. Enters., Inc. v. Girardot, 553
S.E.2d 638, 642 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
249. 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
250. Id. at 1098.
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managers, who would take care of the matter.251 Purportedly, Barnes relied
on the express promise. The offensive profile, however, was not deleted
immediately.252
Therefore, approximately two months later, Barnes filed a breach-ofpromise action against Yahoo.253 The platform owner raised a section 230
immunity defense. The Ninth Circuit rejected the defense, declaring that section 230(c)(1) did not bar Barnes’s promissory estoppel claim.254 In Obado v.
Magedson255 and Herrick v. Grindr,256 the Third Circuit’s and the Southern
District of New York’s respective rulings mirror the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Barnes.257 Conversely, in King v. Facebook, Inc.,258 Brittain v. Twitter,
Inc.,259 and Murphy v. Twitter, Inc.,260 the federal and state courts refused to
embrace the Ninth Circuit’s ruling. Instead, those tribunals accepted
Facebook’s and Twitter’s arguments and declared that section 230(c)(1)
blocked the users’ promissory-estoppel lawsuits.261
Perhaps, the most bewildering and incompatible section 230 decisions
have arisen when content creators sued the same social media provider in the
same court and raised the same theory of recovery. To illustrate, in Lancaster
v. Alphabet Inc.,262 Darnaa, LLC v. Google, Inc.,263 and Enhanced Athlete
251. Id. at 1099.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1109.
255. 612 F. App’x 90 (3d Cir. 2015).
256. 306 F. Supp. 3d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
257. See Obado, 612 F. App’x at 94 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of
plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim on the merits after finding that the CDA
barred other claims); Herrick, 306 F. Supp. 3d at 595 n.13 (addressing the
merits of the plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim because the plaintiff alleged
that Grinder was liable for its own content).
258. 2019 WL 4221768 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2019).
259. 2019 WL 2423375 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2019).
260. 274 Cal. Rptr. 3d 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021).
261. King, 2019 WL 4221768, at *1, *3–5 n.1 (dismissing the user’s promissory
estoppel action under section 230(c)(1) after Facebook removed the user’s
posts, suspended his account, and allegedly discriminated against the user and
other “black activists”); Brittain, 2019 WL 2423375, at *3–4 (dismissing the
user’s promissory estoppel action under section 230(c)(1) after Twitter allegedly suspended the user’s four accounts); Murphy, 274 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 363,
380 (declaring that section 230 barred the user’s promissory estoppel action).
262. 2016 WL 3648608 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2016).
263. 2016 WL 6540452 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016).
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Inc. v. Google LLC,264 disgruntled content creators sued Google and its parent—Alphabet, Inc. The actions were filed in the Northern District of California and, in each complaint, the creators alleged that Google breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by irrationally deleting or
interfering with the creators’ videos on YouTube.265 In Darnaa and Enhanced Athlete, the federal district court in San Jose declared that sections
230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2) did not bar the creators’ lawsuit.266 However, in Lancaster, as well as in Federal Agency of News LLC, v. Facebook, Inc.,267 the
same San Jose court declared that section 230(c)(1) blocked the creators’
lawsuits based on the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing.268
In light of these findings, an important question arises: Why do courts
issue such conflicting preemption rulings when deciding whether content
providers may litigate contract-based claims on the merits? Part VI presents
empirically based and extralegal explanations. But, consider a plausible legal
explanation. Some courts’ apply a questionable syllogism; it begins with the
premise that under the CDA § 230(c)(1), social media entities are “interactive computer service” providers.269 Section 230(c)(2) gives service providers
a statutory right to block and screen offensive material.270 Providers’ standardized “Terms of Services” contracts incorporate the statutory right to delete and remove offense information.271 Therefore, section 230(c)(1) gives
services providers absolute immunity against all contract-based lawsuits.272
264. 479 F. Supp. 3d 824 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
265. See Lancaster, 2016 WL 3648608, at *5; Darnaa, 2016 WL 6540452, at *1,
*8; Enhanced Athlete Inc., 479 F. Supp. 3d, at 830–31.
266. See Darnaa, 2016 WL 6540452, at *1, *8 (deciding that section 230(c)(1) did
not preclude the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim after
Google removed plaintiff’s music videos from YouTube); Enhanced Athlete,
479 F. Supp. 3d at 830–31 (declaring that section 230(c)(1) and section
230(c)(2) did not bar plaintiff’s breach of implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing claim after Google removed plaintiff’s videos on YouTube and
terminate its accounts).
267. 432 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
268. See Lancaster, 2016 WL 3648608, at *5 (dismissing the breach of covenant of
good faith and fair dealing claim, after Alphabet Inc., Google Inc., and YouTube allegedly harassed the user by hacking and intercepting her electronic
communications); Fed. Agency of News, 432 F. Supp. 3d at 1119–20 (concluding that section 230(c)(1) precluded plaintiffs’ breach of an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing claim).
269. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see e.g., Lancaster, 2016 WL 3648608, at *5.
270. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
271. See e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
272. See e.g., Lancaster, 2016 WL 3648608, at *5 (stressing that the CDA section
230(c)(1) precludes any claim that attempts to impose liability on service providers] for removing videos from [YouTube or other social media platforms”]);
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However, assume that section 230(c)(1) expressly or impliedly gives
social media companies absolute immunity against contract-based claims.
Still, the reasoning is arguably faulty considering the broadly accepted rule
that section 230(c)(1) immunizes platform providers against only secondaryliability actions.273 Contract-based actions, however, are quintessential firstparty, direct- or primary-liability actions.274
V. COMPETING CONGRESSIONAL BILLS TO ABOLISH OR
AMEND SAFE-HARBOR DEFENSES AND BOOST RIGHTSPRESERVATION REMEDIES UNDER THE COMMUNICATIONS
DECENCY ACT
As stated earlier, within as well as beyond the United States, there are
widely shared beliefs: (1) social media must be “sanitized”;275 (2) social meZeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (“[L]awsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable
for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.”); see also
Storek & Storek, Inc. v. Citicorp Real Est., Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 267, 277
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“[I]f defendants were given the right to do what they did
by the express provisions of the contract, there can be no breach.”).
273. See, e.g., Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2021) (reaffirming the Barnes test and stressing that section 230(c)(1) “cuts off liability only
when” plaintiffs allege that service providers are secondarily liable for third
parties’ offensive information) (citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096,
1101 (9th Cir. 2009)); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., Inc. v. Am. Online Inc.,
206 F.3d 980, 984–85 (10th Cir. 2000) (reaffirming that section 230(c)(1) provides immunity for civil causes of action based on “information originating
with a third party”); Callahan v. Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 20-cv-08437-LB,
2021 WL 2433893, *6 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2021) (observing that under Section
230(c)(1), service providers are immune only against third-party claims).
274. Cf. Hill v. Metro. Dev. & Hous. Agency, No. 01A-01-9109-CH-0034, 90-3615III, 1992 WL 41709, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 1992) (concluding that the
proper remedy for the plaintiff would be “a direct action for breach of contract”); United States ex rel. Ryan v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., No. 04-CV2483(JG)(CLP), 2011 WL 1841795, at *8 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2011) (declaring that party may commence a primary-liability, breach-of-contract action
to secure an indemnification award).
275. See Hill, supra note 23 (reporting that the EU recently proposed the Digital
Services Act and Digital Markets Act, which will not address the extreme toxicity of the digital media platforms); John Owen Nwachukwu, FG Exposes
Those Behind Fake News, Issues Strong Warning, DAILY POST (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://dailypost.ng/2020/02/20/fg-exposes-those-behind-fake-news-issuesstrong-warning/ [https://perma.cc/55MN-8XGQ] (reporting that the Nigerian
government believes “fake news, misinformation and hate speech [are] weapons of choice . . . to create tension in the polity and destabilize the country,”
and that Nigeria will implement new “communication regulations” to sanitize
social media by monitoring Google, Whatsapp, Twitter, and Facebook); Col-
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dia platforms encourage users to post “filthy,” “dangerously toxic,” “highly
polluted,” and “politically corrosive” information;276 and (3) social media
owners are “politically biased.”277 Some African, Asian, and European governments have introduced or implemented controversial regulations, which
are designed to “sanitize social media.”278 Similarly, as of this writing, Senate and House members are considering numerous bills that would force tech
companies to “sanitize” their social media platforms.279
A few bills would abolish the Communications Decency Act.280 However, the majority would only amend or clarify certain provisions.281 For exleen Wood, In Central Asia, Politics By Way of Social Media, THE DIPLOMAT
(Feb. 22, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/in-central-asia-politics-byway-of-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/96LH-XENW] (“Kazakh authorities
have attempted to sanitize social media as a potential source of discontent and
organizing . . . [by creating government-sponsored content]”); Traci Tong,
Hong Kong Has Grabbed Headlines Around the World—Except in Beijing,
THE WORLD (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-09-29/hongkong-has-grabbed-headlines-around-world-except-beijing [https://perma.cc/
34SD-7JS] (reporting that the Chinese government decided to sanitize social
media by blocking users’ access to Instagram and censoring “pro-democracy”
content on its Internet and social media sites).
276. See Hill, supra note 23; Nwachukwu, supra note 275; Wood, supra note 275;
Tong, supra note 275.
277. See Hill, supra note 23; Nwachukwu, supra note 275; Wood, supra note
275275; Tong, supra note 275.
278. See Hill, supra note 23; Nwachukwu, supra note 275; Wood, supra note 275;
Tong, supra note 275.
279. See generally Jeevanjee et al., supra note 57 (reporting that a flurry of bills
were introduced in Congress between 2020 and 2021 and disclosing that the
Tech, Law, & Security Program at the American University-Washington College of Law and at Duke University’s Center on Science & Technology Policy
are partnering to track all proposed section 230 legislation).
280. Id.; see also Theodore Claypoole, Should CDA Section 230 Be Changed?,
WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/should-cda-section-230-be-changed-9506849/§ 230 [https://perma.
cc/6W9T-HVC8] (“Both US political parties—when evincing concern about
the size and power of digital social media companies—claim that [CDA’s protections against] lawsuits should be abolished. Both Presidents Biden and
Trump have advocated for its revocation. Some see this as a simple way to
punish Facebook, Google and Twitter for specific disfavored behavior.”); Reed
& Steyer, supra note 20 (“Washington would be better off throwing out Section
230 and starting over.” (emphasis added)).
281. See generally Jeevanjee et al., supra note 57 (disclosing that various bills
would (1) repeal section 230; (2) limit the scope of safe-harbor immunity; (3)
modify the current safe-harbor protections by imposing “new” duty-of-care or
quid-pro-quo obligation; and (4) adding a right-preservation clause to protect
civil rights and political speech.).
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ample, the proposed Curbing Abuse and Saving Expression in Technology
(CASE-IT) Act282 would add a rights-preservation or private-rights-of-action
exemption. If enacted, the exemption would allow users to commence civil
action against “dominant companies whose content-moderation policies are
inconsistent with the First Amendment.”283 Even more titillating, a widely
discussed suggestion would add a broad rights-preservation exemption to the
CDA284—like the private-rights-of-action exemption in the CERCLA.285
Still, another extensively discussed proposal would add a hybrid rights-preservation and safe-harbor clause to the CDA—like the savings clause in the
Federal Arbitration Act.286
282. See id. (Republican representatives sponsored and introduced the Curbing
Abuse and Saving Expression in Technology (CASE-IT) Act on October 30,
2020. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce.).
283. Id.
284. Cf. Nicole Karlis, Senator Amy Klobuchar: Social Media Sites Should Be Fined
If They Can’t Discard Bots, SALON (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.salon.com/
2018/02/26/senator-amy-klobuchar-social-media-sites-should-be-fined-if-theycannot-discard-bots/ [https://perma.cc/2GW8-XVFT] (reporting that the senator espouses a retributive punishment system for social-media companies
which is akin to what industrial companies face when they dump toxic waste
and create a “Superfund site”); Lisa H. Macpherson, Addressing Information
Pollution with a “Superfund for the Internet”, INFO. SOC’Y PROJECT, YALE L.
SCHOOL (Mar. 2, 2021), https://law.yale.edu/isp/initiatives/wikimedia-initiative-intermediaries-and-information/wiii-blog/addressing-information-pollution-superfund-internet [https://perma.cc/L3SE-WMLU] (arguing that
platforms are toxic and similar to the “toxic chemicals that industrial companies dumped into fresh water,” encouraging Congress to establish a “superfund
for toxic social media, waste sites,” like the Environmental Protection
Agency’s 1980 Superfund); McNamee, supra note 21 (“Facebook, Google and
Twitter aided the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol and . . . amplify hate speech,
disinformation and conspiracy theories. . . . Beginning in 1960, Congress
passed a series of laws to address air pollution, water pollution, [and] environmental remediation. . . . The culture and business model of some Internet platforms pose a clear and present danger to . . . public health and our democracy.
We must reform this industry to protect ourselves[.]”).
285. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601–9675).
286. See Mark MacCarthy, A Dispute Resolution Program for Social Media Companies, BROOKINGS (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-disputeresolution-program-for-social-media-companies/ [https://perma.cc/6AKAPM3X] (“New ideas for digital governance are most urgent [to address] the
information disorder within the social medial industry [as well as] hate speech
and disinformation . . . on the largest platforms. . . . Congress should establish a
non-governmental industry-public authority under the supervision of a federal
regulatory commission to provide affordable and efficient arbitration and medi-
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Once more, Congress enacted the CERCLA and other federal environmental-protection laws to help cleanup highly polluted and dangerous environments.287 Therefore, the CERCLA’s rights-preservation exemption allows
aggrieved persons to sue polluting industries.288 Also, under certain conditions, the FAA’s savings provision allows complainants to seek certain contract- and tort-based remedies in a court of law rather than in an arbitral
proceeding.289
ation services to social media companies to satisfy this obligation for independent review.”); Rogers, supra note 24 (“[H]ere is a modest proposal to . . .
redress false, wrongful or defamatory speech—without centering any censorship power within social media company . . . and without repealing Section
230. . . . [Congress could create] a special fast-track arbitration system for
social media [speech-related disputes.]”).
287. See generally Willy E. Rice, The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: A
Review of 2007–2008 Insurance Decisions, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1013,
1069–74 nn.570–630 (2009) [hereinafter Rice, 2007–2008 Insurance Decisions] (discussing toxic pollution, the CERCLA’s history, and Super-Funds
claims from an insurance-defense perspective); Willy E. Rice, The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: A Selective Review and Analysis of the Panels’
2010–2011 Insurance-Law Opinions, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 733, 795–812
nn.583–748 (2012) [hereinafter Rice, 2010–2011 Insurance Law Opinions]
(discussing toxic-pollution and CERCLA Super-Funds claims from an insurance-defense perspective).
288. Rice, 2007–2008 Insurance Decisions, supra note 287; Rice, 2010–2011 Insurance Law Opinions, supra note 287.
289. See generally Willy E. Rice, Federal Courts and the Regulation of the Insurance Industry: An Empirical and Historical Analysis of Courts’ Ineffectual Attempts to Harmonize Federal Antitrust, Arbitration and Insolvency Statutes
with the McCarran-Ferguson Act—1941–1993, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 399,
431–35 nn.147–168 (1994) [hereinafter Rice, McCarran-Ferguson Act]
(presenting numerous decisions and explaining the interplay between the FAA
and the McCarran-Ferguson Act); Willy E. Rice, Courts Gone “Irrationally
Biased” in Favor of the Federal Arbitration Act?—Enforcing Arbitration Provisions in Standardized Application Forms and Marginalizing Consumer-Protection, Antidiscrimination, and States’ Contract Laws: A 1925–2014 Legal
and Empirical Analysis, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 405, 483–93
nn.568–600 (2015) [hereinafter Rice, Irrationally Biased] (discussing the
FAA’s savings clause and presenting empirical and statistical arguments
against enforcing mandatory-arbitration clauses); Willy E. Rice, Unconscionable Judicial Disdain For Unsophisticated Consumers And Employees’ Contractual Rights?— Legal And Empirical Analyses of Courts’ Mandatory
Arbitration Rulings And The Systematic Erosion of Procedural And Substantive
Unconscionability Defenses Under The Federal Arbitration Act, 1800–2015,
25 B.U. PUB. INT’L L.J. 143, 148–54 nn.27–49 (2016) [hereinafter Rice, Unconscionable Judicial Disdain] (discussing the FAA’s savings clause and outlining legal, historical and empirical arguments against enforcing mandatoryarbitration clauses).
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Thus, reconsider the question: Would adding a CERCLA-like rightspreservation exemption to the CDA actually enhance disgruntled users’ ability to sue large social media companies? And if so, would state or federal
courts be more or less likely to compel Google, YouTube, Facebook and
Amazon to remove allegedly toxic, polluted and politically biased content
from their platforms? Would adding an FAA-like rights-preservation exemption actually enhance dissatisfied content providers’ ability to circumvent
Google’s, Facebook’s or Amazon’s federal preemption-defenses and litigate
all types of common-law and statutory claims in state and federal courts?
Alternatively, would a hybrid FAA-like safe-harbor and rights-preservation
clause just force discontented content creators to circumvent an FAA-preemption defense rather than a CDA-preemption defense? In the next section,
the legal analyses and empirical findings will provide some plausible answers to these timely questions.
VI. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY—THE EFFECTS OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL AND LEGAL FACTORS ON THE
DISPOSITIONS OF SOCIAL-MEDIA, SAFE-HARBOR AND
RIGHTS-PRESERVATION DISPUTES IN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS
To repeat an earlier observation, “progressive” as well as “conservative”
content creators strongly dislike and criticize the section 230 immunity defense.290 Therefore, responding to constituents’ concerns, Republicans and
Democrats have introduced various bills.291 But, a central question has
emerged: whether Congress’ adding an unambiguous rights-preservation exemption and weakening the current safe-harbor defense would actually increase social media plaintiffs’ ability to litigate or arbitrate various legal
claims on the merits.
Usually, when deciding any federal preemption dispute, two principles
guide federal and state courts’ inquiries: (1) a case-by-case analysis must be
employed to determine whether plaintiffs may defeat a preemption defense,292 and (2) a factual analysis— involving a thorough examination of
probative facts and legal claims—must occur rather that a reflexive applica290. See generally Jeevanjee et al., supra note 57.
291. See generally id.
292. See, e.g., Backpage.com, LLC v. Hawley, No. 4:17–CV–1951 PLC, 2017 WL
5726868, at *11 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 28, 2017) (stressing that a court must consider
disputed facts as well as conduct a factual inquiry and detailed legal analysis
when determining whether the CDA preempts state-law claims); Hill v.
StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 562 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (concluding that none
of the trial court’s factual analysis precluded the online seller’s immunity under
the CDA section 230). See also In re Bentz Metal Prods. Co., 253 F.3d 283,
285 (7th Cir. 2001) (stressing that whether a federal statute preempts a state
law claim requires a “case-by-case factual analysis.”); Blair v. Medtronic, Inc.,
No. 3:15–cv–01678–SC, 2015 WL 5728050, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2015)
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tion of rules.293 These principles, however, have generated another question:
What types of information would qualify as probative or relevant facts?
Stated simply, courts have not fashioned or adopted a clearly defined or universal standard.
Nevertheless, a rather large cluster of randomly selected CDA section
230 decisions suggests some of the most “relevant or probative facts” appear
under the following labels: types of social media plaintiffs, types of social
media defendants, social media litigants’ geographic locations, social media
complainants’ underlying common law and statutory causes of action, and
social media defendants’ affirmative defenses.294 Therefore, the author decided to conduct a study of courts’ CDA section 230 decisions in light of the
substantially heated and political debate over whether Congress should abolish, amend, or restrict the CDA’s immunity defense. Perhaps, federal and
state courts’ analyses and conclusions can provide some meaningful “judicial
guidance” as Congress weighs numerous CDA-reform bills.
A.

Data Sources, Sampling Procedures, and Background Attributes
of Social Media and Other Relevant Litigants

Following standard research methodologies, the Author crafted a null
hypothesis: no statistically significant difference exists between social media
owners’ and dissatisfied content creators’ likelihood of winning federal-preemption disputes in state and federal courts. An alternate hypothesis states:

(reaffirming that even a preliminary review of preemption disputes requires a
close factual analysis to determine whether federal law preempts the claims).
293. See, e.g., Hawley, 2017 WL 5726868, at *11; Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 562; see also
In re Bentz Metal Prods. Co., 253 F.3d at 285; Blair, 2015 WL 5728050, at *3.
294. Cf. Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2019)
(reaffirming that defendant must establish three factors in order to secure immunity under the CDA section 230: (1) Defendant is a provider or user of an
interactive computer service; (2) defendant is a publisher or speaker of information in the underlying cause of action; and (3) a third-party creator provided
the controversial information); Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d
376, 388–89 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (same); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando
Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (examining “particular facts” to determine whether Roommates qualified as a “content
provider” and concluding that the company was not immunized from liability
(emphasis added)); Saponaro v. Grindr, LLC, 93 F. Supp. 3d 319, 322 (D.N.J.
2015) (“The salient issues . . . are whether [d]efendant is immune from liability
under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 . . . and whether
[p]laintiff has otherwise pled sufficient facts to state claims for negligence”
(emphasis added)); Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 801 (N.D.
Cal. 2011) (examining “particular facts” to determine whether Facebook qualified as an “information content provider” and, thus, exposed to liability (emphasis added)).
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“case-specific facts” or “extralegal factors”295 are more likely to explain any
statistically significant difference between tech companies’ and various social media complainants’ likelihood of prevailing in federal-preemption
trials.
To secure a sample of section 230 preemption cases, the Author crafted
two simple queries: (1) communications decency act and (2) communications
decency act and immunity. The queries were executed on Lexis-Nexis,
Thomson-Westlaw, and Google-Scholar platforms. The goal was to uncover
every reported and unreported decision involving the Communications Decency Act. Ultimately, the searches generated 215 “on-point” decisions.296
There is more. For nearly three decades, the Author has sampled, analyzed, and coded hundreds of judicial decisions involving insurance-law,
class-action, and consumer-protection quarrels.297 Several articles have been
published.298 A happenstance review of numerous variables in the Author’s
database uncover a well-defined federal preemption variable, which is associated with every judicial decision. A search retrieved two groups of CER295. See, e.g., Recent Publications, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1343, 1344 (2011) (emphasis added) (reviewing and reporting an author’s empirical findings: “[The author employs] an expertise in political science and a robust understanding of
legal analysis to illuminate the impact [of extrajudicial factors on the decision
in a case. . . . [The author] sketches a divided federal court system where . . .
[appellate courts are] more sympathetic to the facts of a case than the policydriven Supreme Court.”).
296. On Westlaw, the restricted query—SY(“communications decency act”)— retrieved a list of 202 “on-point” cases. Later searches of Lexis-Nexis and
Google-Scholar produced thirteen additional cases (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
297. See Rice, McCarran-Ferguson Act, supra note 289, at 399, 431–35 nn.147–68
(presenting numerous decisions and explaining the interplay between the FAA
and the McCarran-Ferguson Act); Rice, Irrationally Biased, supra note 289, at
405, 483–93 nn.568–600 (discussing the FAA’s savings clause and presenting
empirical and statistical arguments against enforcing mandatory arbitration
clauses); Rice, Unconscionable Judicial Disdain, supra note 289, at 143,
148–54 nn.27–49 (discussing the FAA’s savings clause and outlining legal,
historical and empirical arguments against enforcing mandatory-arbitration
clauses); Rice, 2007–2008 Insurance Decisions, supra note 287, at 1013,
1069–74 nn.570–630 (discussing toxic-pollution and CERCLA Super-Funds
claims from an insurance-defense perspective); Rice, 2010–2011 Insurance
Law Opinions, supra note 287, at 733, 795–812 nn.583–748 (discussing toxicpollution and CERCLA Super-Funds claims from an insurance-defense
perspective).
298. See Rice, McCarran-Ferguson Act, supra note 289, at, 399, 431–35
nn.147–68; Rice, Irrationally Biased, supra note 289, at 405, 483–93
nn.568–600; Rice, Unconscionable Judicial Disdain, supra note 289, at 143,
148–54 nn.27–49; Rice, 2007–2008 Insurance Decisions, supra note 287, at
1013, 1069–74 nn.570–630; Rice, 2010–2011 Insurance Law Opinions, supra
note 287, at 733, 795–812 nn.583–748.
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CLA and FAA preemption cases—584 and 240, respectively. These latter
cases are also included in the present study. Therefore, the sample size is
N=1,039.299 Perhaps, comparing courts’ dispositions of “observed” or known
CDA, FAA, and CERCLA preemption quarrels will help answer the question
of whether Congress should abolish the CDA’s current safe-harbor provision
and add FAA- and CERCLA-equivalent rights-preservation exemptions to
the CDA.
The Author also applied another widely used methodology to analyze
the content or information in each reported case.300 Multiple binary (0,1) or
“dummy”301 variables were created. Ultimately, the binary data were inserted
into a large matrix. Various statistical procedures were applied to analyze the
data and, the results are displayed below in four tables.
B.

Federal Preemption Disputes and the Characteristics of Social
Media and Other Litigants in State and Federal Courts

Table 1 presents several clusters of information about content creators,
users and third parties who filed lawsuits against social media providers and
other defendants in state and federal courts. The categories are: types of federal preemption statutes, courts’ geographic locations, types of social media
and other plaintiffs, types of social media and other defendants, social media
and other plaintiffs’ underlying theories of recovery, types of safe-harbor
and rights-preservation defenses, and the dispositions of disputes.
First, federal rather than state courts are more likely to resolve litigants’
CDA-related disagreements. The statistically significant percentages are

299. The 1039 cases’ names and citations cannot be included here. Briefly, the footnote would be exceedingly and prohibitively long, exceeding 6000 words.
However, a large Excel database of the sampled cases, citations and multiple
Stata-Program working files—containing procedures, tables, and statistics—
are stored at the Author’s location and/or with this law journal’s office.
300. See generally Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis
of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 77, 88, 90–91 nn.58, 103, 111–12
(2008) (presenting a history and description of Professor Rice’s published content and statistical analyses of common-law and statutory questions of law);
Daniel T. Young, How Do You Measure a Constitutional Moment? Using Algorithmic Topic Modeling to Evaluate Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1990, 2010–13 (2013) (embracing and
discussing content analysis); Robert E. Mitchell, The Use of Content Analysis
for Explanatory Studies, 31 PUB. OPINION Q. 230, 237 (1967).
301. Briefly, each subcategory is an independent binary (0, 1) or “dummy” variable.
See Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 223 n.54 (2014)
(discussing probit analysis and the construction of binary (0,1) or “dummy
variables”); WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 116–18 (5th ed.
2003) (explaining the purpose and use of dummy variables in regression
analysis).

2021]

Abolishing Communications Decency Act Sanitize

301

58.6% and 41.4%, respectively. In addition, parents and relatives as well as
professional and governmental entities are more likely to settle social media
and other disputes in state courts.
“Undisputed, Specific and
Relevant” Facts or Predictors

State Courts
(N = 502)

Federal Courts
(N = 537)
(N = 1039)

FEDERAL PREEMPTION STATUTES:
Communications Decency Act
Federal Arbitration Act
†
CERCLA

41.4
48.8
53.3 *

58.6 *
51.2
46.7

(N = 215)
(N = 584)
(N = 240)

COURTS’ GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS:
East
Midwest
South
Southwest
West

33.5
53.0
57.0 ***
41.0
53.5

66.5 ***
47.0
43.0
59.0 ***
46.5

(N = 245)
(N = 234)
(N = 206)
(N = 81)
(N = 273)

SOCIAL-MEDIA & OTHER PLAINTIFFS:
Parents & Relatives
Minor Children
Professionals
Government Entities
Businesses Entities & Others

68.4 *
50.0
55.0 *
52.5
45.1

31.6
50.0
45.0
47.5
54.9 *

(N = 19)
(N = 24)
(N = 102)
(N = 236)
(N = 658)

SOCIAL-MEDIA & OTHER DEFENDANTS:
Social-Media Internet Providers
Social-Media Content Creators
Other Business & Corporate Entities

36.6
52.5 *
50.0

63.4 *
47.5
50.0 *

(N = 101)
(N = 114)
(N = 824)

SOCIAL MEDIA & OTHER PLAINTIFFS’
UNDERLYING THEORIES OF RECOVERY
Intentional-Tort Actions
Negligence-Based Actions
Contract-Based Actions

49.0
44.4
51.7

51.0
55.6
48.3

(N = 196)
(N = 412)
(N = 431)

SAFE-HARBOR & RIGHTS SAVINGS DEFENSES:
CDA-Safe Harbor-Vicarious Liability
FAA-Savings Clause-Unconscionability
CERCLA-Saved Environmental State Rights

53.6
60.0
53.3

46.4
40.0
46.7

(N = 97)
(N = 215)
(N = 240)

DISPOSITIONS FROM PLAINTIFFS’ VIEWPOINT
WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR OTHER FACTORS:
Favorable Outcomes
Unfavorable Outcomes

65.5 ***
34.5

55.5
44.5 ***

+

Levels of statistical significance for the Chi Square test: *** p  .0001 ** p  .001 * p  .05
†
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
+
There were only 552 cases in the databaseʊwhich raised these “defenses” or “retorts.”

The corresponding percentages are 68.4%, 55.0% and 52.5%. Conversely, social media and other business entities are more likely (54.9%) to
litigate in federal courts.
An even more interesting finding, however, appears under the heading
“types of social media and other defendants.” Generally, platform providers
are defendants. But, users and content providers can also be CDA defendants
or co-defendants. Thus, Table 1 reveals that platform providers are more
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likely (63.4%) to be defendants in federal courts. On the other hand, users
and content creators are more likely (53.5%) to be defendants in state courts.
Two additional and highly probative302 findings also appear in the table,
although they are not statistically significant: almost equal percentages of
underlying tort and contract based causes of action are filed in state and
federal courts. Additionally, CDA, FAA, and CERCLA litigants are substantially more likely to raise safe-harbor and rights-preservation arguments in
state courts than in federal courts. Respectively, the reported percentages are
53.6%, 60.0%, and 53.3%.
Finally, the last two rows in Table 1 present a statistically significant
finding, which arguably arose from state and federal courts’ weighing and
applying other factors rather than foundational principles of law. Without
controlling for any other legal or extralegal factor, plaintiffs—including social media complainants—are statistically and exceedingly more likely
(65.5%) to prevail both procedurally and substantively in state courts. However, in federal courts, plaintiffs’ likelihood of prevailing drops ten percent
and defendants’ probability rises. The percentages are 55.5% and 44.5%,
respectively.
C.

Bivariate Relationships Between Predictors and the Dispositions
of Preemption Disputes Under the Communications Decency
Act

Why are social media complainants more or less likely to win section
230 immunity quarrels, depending on the types of courts? To find a reasonably persuasive answer, consider Table 2 and the displayed bivariate relationships between various predictors and the dispositions of preemption disputes.
First, review the two columns of percentages that appear under the heading
“State Trial Courts’ Disposition of Actions.”

302. See Probative Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 579 (7th ed.1999) (defining “probative evidence” as evidence that tends to prove or disprove a disputed
issue).

43.6
20.2
30.8
7.7
23.7
38.9
19.2
33.3
53.3
34.2
55.6
30.0
32.2
30.3
31.7

SOCIAL MEDIA DEFENDANTS:
“Online Interactive Service Providers”
“Content Creators & Users”

PLAINTIFFS’ UNDERLYING ACTIONS:
Contract-Based Actions
Negligence-Based Actions
Defamation/Libel
Conversion/Nuisance
Common-Law Bad Faith
False Advertisement
Copyright Infringement
Deceptive Trade Practices
Civil Rights Claims

SAFE-HARBOR IMMUNITY DEFENSE:
Provider Raised the Defense
Defense Was Not Raised

JURISDICTIONS:
State Courts
Federal Courts

Levels of statistical significance for the Chi Square test:

37.1
27.1
57.1
10.5
12.5

SOCIAL MEDIA PLAINTIFFS:
Business & Corporate Entities
Professional Entities
Governmental Entities
Minor Children
Parents & Relatives

PREDICTORS

*** p d .0001

69.7
68.3

70.0
67.8

69.2
92.3
76.3
61.1
80.8
66.7
46.7
65.8
44.4

56.4
79.8

62.9
72.9
42.9
89.5
87.5

** p d .05

(N = 89)
(N = 126)

(N = 97)
(N = 118)

(N = 13)
(N = 13)
(N = 59)
(N = 18)
(N = 26)
(N = 15)
(N = 15)
(N = 38)
(N = 18)
**

**
**

**
**

(N = 101)
(N = 114) ***

(N = 89)
(N = 85) **
(N = 14)
(N = 19) **
(N = 8)

Trial Courts’ Disposition of Actions From
the Perspectives of Social-Media Plaintiffs
Favorable
Unfavorable
(N = 215)
Percent
Percent
Number

35.1
33.8

26.0
44.1

45.5
60.0
23.1
9.1
28.6
75.0
28.6
42.9
45.4

52.5
22.1

44.7
23.5
77.8
7.1
71.4

64.9
66.2

74.0
55.9

54.5
40.0
76.9
90.9
71.4
25.0
71.4
57.1
54.6

47.5
78.9

55.3
76.5
22.2
92.9
28.6

(N = 77) **
(N = 68) **

(N = 77) **
(N = 68) **

(N = 11)
(N = 10) **
(N = 52) **
(N = 11) **
(N = 14)
(N = 8) **
(N = 7)
(N = 21) **
(N = 11)

(N = 59) ***
(N = 86)

(N = 47) ***
(N = 68)
(N = 9) ***
(N = 14)
(N = 7) ***

Appellate Courts’ Disposition of Actions From
the Perspectives of Social-Media Plaintiffs
Favorable
Unfavorable
(N = 145)
Percent
Percent
Number
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The percentages indicate some key factors are statistically and significantly more likely to increase or decrease social media complainants’ likelihood of winning a section 230 controversy. For example, local and state
governmental entities are more likely to prevail (57.1%) against social media
companies in state trial courts and federal district courts. On the other hand,
aggrievants are statistically and substantially less likely to win federal-preemption disputes when defendants are interactive service providers rather
than users or content providers. The reported percentages are 79.8%, and
43.6%, respectively.
Table 2 also presents two arguably and highly irrational findings. First,
trial and district courts are statistically and significantly more likely to block
underlying social media lawsuits if the plaintiffs raise the following claims:
breach of contract, negligence, defamation, conversion or nuisance, bad faith,
false advertisement, and deceptive trade practices. The reported percentages
range between 61.1% and 92.3%. However, a section 230 defense is statistically and significantly less likely to preempt users’ and content creators’ underlying copyright-infringement and civil-rights lawsuits. The respective
percentages are 53.3% and 55.6%.
Now, review the two columns of percentages that appear under the
heading “Appellate Courts’ Disposition of Actions.” Among the appealed
CDA-preemption cases, the findings mirror some of those discussed above.
For example, on appeal, local and state governmental entities as well as parents and relatives are statistically and substantially more likely to survive a
section 230 preemption defense. The corresponding percentages are 77.8%
and 71.4%. Also, before appellate courts, aggrievants are statistically and
substantially more likely to win preemption disputes when defendants are
interactive service providers. However, aggrievants are less likely to prevail
when users or content providers are defendants. The percentages are 52.5%
and 78.9%, respectively.
On appeal, are the effects of plaintiffs’ underlying theories of recovery
on the dispositions of CDA-preemption suits similar to those in trial and
district courts? The answer is no. Courts of appeals are statistically and substantially less likely to preempt plaintiffs’ negligence-based and false-advertisement lawsuits. The respective percentages are 60.0% and 75.6%. On the
contrary, courts of appeals are more likely to block the following lawsuits:
breach of contract, defamation, conversion or nuisance, bad-faith, copyright
infringement, deceptive trade practices, and civil rights. These latter appellate-court percentages range between 54.5% and 90.9%.
Finally, Table 2 provides a more detailed presentation of an earlier finding. In both lower and appellate courts, social media providers rather than
content providers are substantially more likely to prevail. The reported percentages range from 64.9% to 69.7%. In contrast, platform providers’ likelihood of success decreases appreciably if they fail to raise a safe-harborimmunity defense in courts of appeals. The percentages are 55.9% to 74.0%,
respectively. Again, some reformers strongly suggest that the CDA’s safe-
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harbor defense should be abolished.303 Do the latter findings among appellate-court decisions fortify CDA reformers’ argument? Should Congress
completely repeal the CDA’s safe harbor defense and replace it with a broad
and user-friendly private-rights-of-actions exemption? The findings and analysis in the next section provide some plausible answers.
D.

A Bivariate Analysis—The Relationship Between the Dispositions
of Federal Preemption Disputes and Courts’ Application of
Safe-Harbor and Rights-Preservation Rules

To repeat, arguably extremely powerful and influential mainstream-media owners as well as affiliates of prestigious technology-and-law centers
have presented a serious suggestion: Congress should weigh the rights-preservation and safe-harbor provisions in the FAA,304 as well as in CERCLA,305
and add substantially equivalent or mirror-image provisions to the CDA.306
Briefly, under the FAA’s “savings clause,” state and federal courts may
not enforce mandatory-arbitration agreements if “grounds . . . exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”307 Thus, in theory, a user or
content provider may sue a platform provider in a court of law if an arbitration clause in a “Term of Use” agreement is procedurally or substantively
unconscionable.308
Similarly, under CERCLA section 107, a private party may sue a “polluter” for environmental clean-up costs, if the latter improperly dispenses
toxic or hazardous waste.309 Additionally, CERCLA section 310(a)(1) allows
any person to commence a civil action against any person who allegedly
violated “any standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order” under
the act.310 And, CERCLA section 310 (c) gives a district court jurisdiction to
enforce any standard, order corrective action, and impose civil penalties.311
Are the influential reformers’ recommendations sensible or persuasive?
Would simply adding a mirror image of the FAA’s savings clause to the
CDA statistically and significantly increase content providers’ ability to liti303. See generally supra Part V and accompanying notes and text.
304. Supra Part V and accompanying notes and text.
305. Supra Part V and accompanying notes and text.
306. Supra Part V and accompanying notes and text.
307. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
308. See generally Rice, Unconscionable Judicial Disdain, supra note 289, at
163–76.
309. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (“[I]ndividuals are liable for . . . (A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a
State . . . [and] (B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person.”).
310. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1).
311. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(c).
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gate social-media disagreements on the merits? Would adding a CERCLAequivalent rights-preservation exemption to the CDA increase claimants’
likelihood of litigating “toxic social media” disputes in state and federal
courts?

26.7
52.3
39.3

SAVINGS & SAFE-HARBOR CLAUSES:
CDA-Safe Harbor-Vicarious Liability
FAA-Savings Clause-Unconscionability
CERCLA-Saved Environmental Rights

Levels of statistical significance for the Chi Square test:

32.0
42.1
49.0

PLAINTIFFS’ CAUSES OF ACTION:
Intentional Torts
Negligence-Based
Contract-Based

PREDICTORS

32.7
65.1
35.4

SAVINGS & SAFE-HARBOR CLAUSES:
CDA-Safe Harbor-Vicarious Liability
FAA-Savings Clause-Unconscionability
CERCLA-Saved Environmental Rights
67.3
34.9
64.6

62.5
55.0
41.3
(N = 52)
(N = 129) ***
(N = 127) ***

(N = 96)
(N = 182) ***
(N = 223) ***

*** p d .0001

** p d .01

73.3
47.7
60.7

68.0
57.9
51.0

* p d .05

(N = 45)
(N = 86) **
(N = 112) **

(N = 100) **
(N = 228)
(N = 208) **

Federal District Courts’ Disposition of Actions
From Plaintiffs’ Perspectives
Favorable
Unfavorable
Number
Percent
Percent

37.5
45.0
58.7

PLAINTIFFS’ CAUSES OF ACTION:
Intentional Torts
Negligence-Based
Contract-Based

PREDICTORS

State Trial Courts’ Disposition of Actions
From Plaintiffs’ Perspectives
Favorable
Unfavorable
Number
Percent
Percent

70.2
58.1
52.2

62.0
54.3
60.0

(N = 47)
(N = 129)
(N = 111)

(N = 87)
(N = 164)
(N = 222)

20.0
33.7
25.0

17.7
42.5
37.2

80.0
66.7
75.0

82.3
57.5
62.8

(N = 30)
(N = 83)
(N = 60)

(N = 62)
(N = 160) **
(N = 199) **

Federal Courts of Appeals’ Disposition of Actions
From Plaintiffs’ Perspectives
Favorable
Unfavorable
Number
Percent
Percent

29.8
41.9
47.8

38.0
45.7
40.0

State Appellate Courts’ Disposition of Actions
From Plaintiffs’ Perspectives
Favorable
Unfavorable
Number
Percent
Percent
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Consider the information in Table 3. Generally, the table displays the
effects of two predictors—types of causes of action as well as types of safeharbor and rights-preservation rules—on the dispositions of federal-preemption disputes. First, review the predictors and percentages that appear under
the headings “State Trial Courts’ Disposition of Actions” and “Federal District Courts’ Disposition of Actions.” Briefly, in both state and federal lower
courts, plaintiffs have greater and almost equal probabilities of circumventing a preemption defense only when they commence contract-based lawsuits. The respective percentages are 58.7% and 49.0%.
But, even more revealing and relevant, in state and federal trial courts,
plaintiffs have a greater likelihood of winning preemption disputes only if
they raise an FAA-related rights-preservation argument. The corresponding
percentages are 65.1% and 52.3%. Contrarily, defendants have substantially
large probabilities of prevailing when defendants raise a CDA-safe- harbor
defense—67.3% and 73.3%, respectively— in state and federal trial courts.
Additionally, defendants’ probabilities also increase substantially when
plaintiffs advance a CERCLA rights-preservation argument in state and federal trial courts. The percentages are 64.6% and 60.7%, respectively.
Now, consider the two columns of percentages that appear under the
headings “State Appellate Courts’ Disposition of Actions” and “Federal
Courts of Appeals’ Disposition of Actions.” The results are clear. Without
controlling for other factors, defendants are more likely to win federal-preemption quarrels in appellate courts. But, even more impressive, defendants
are substantially more likely to prevail (1) if they raise a CDA safe-harbor
defense, or (2) if plaintiffs advance an FAA-rights-preservation or a CERCLA-rights-preservation argument. The lopsided and pro-defendants percentages range between 52.2% and 80.0%.
In light of these simple bivariate statistics and findings, reconsider the
questions: Would adding a vigorous rights-preservation exemption to the
CDA force companies to “sanitize” social-media platforms by reducing
users’ purportedly “toxic,” “defamatory,” and “digitally polluted” information? Would adding an unequivocal private-right-of-action exemption also
help, say, sitting and former U.S. presidents312 to “sanitize” Facebook,
Google and Twitter by terminating tech companies’ allegedly “politically biased” and “discriminatory moderation practices”? Without measuring the in-

312. See Cat Zakrzewski & Rachel Lerman, Trump files class-action lawsuits
targeting Facebook, Twitter, and Google’s YouTube over ‘censorship’ of
conservatives, WASH. POST (July 7, 2021 2:45, PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/07/07/trump-lawsuit-social-media/
(“Legal experts and business associations immediately criticized the claims,
predicting they had little chance of succeeding in court. . . . The suits allege
that the companies violated Trump’s First Amendment rights [by] suspending
his accounts and . . . [asked] the court to strike down Section 230—a decadesold Internet law that protects tech companies from lawsuits over content
moderation decisions. The suits seek unspecified punitive damages.”).
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dependent, combined, and simultaneous influences of other variables on the
outcomes of social-media-immunity disputes, the probable answer to each
question is no.
E.

A Two-Stage Probit Analysis of Multiple Factors’ Effects on
Federal and State Courts’ Dispositions of Social-MediaPreemption Disputes

Earlier, we learned that several interrelated section 230 questions are
producing judicial splits regarding: (1) whether platform owners are secondarily liable for actively and intentionally encouraging creators to post alreadydeveloped and illegal content on the entities’ platform;313 (2) whether tech
companies are secondarily liable for intentionally encouraging content creators to develop “new” and illegal content;314 and (3) whether social media
providers are secondarily liable for modifying their platforms, which encourage or induce users to post offensive content.315

313. See Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 560 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (stressing
that a website owner who encourages the publication of unlawful material does
not expose the owner to legal action); DiMeo v. Max, 248 F. App’x 280, 281
(3d Cir. 2007) (affirming the lower court’s holding that a website’s owner who
hosted allegedly defamatory material was entitled to section 230(c)(1) immunity); S.C. v. Dirty World, LLC, No. 11–CV–00392–DW, 2012 WL 3335284,
at *4 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2012) (holding that an entity’s merely encouraging
defamatory posts is insufficient to defeat CDA immunity); Ascentive, LLC v.
Opinion Corp., No. 10 Civ. 4433(ILG)(SMG), 2011 WL 6181452, at *20
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2011) (concluding that the website did not lose immunity
for encouraging consumers to post negative comments); Glob. Royalties, Ltd.
v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (D. Ariz. 2008) (holding
that operator of consumer review website did not lose section 230(c)(1) immunity simply for encouraging third parties to post defamatory content).
314. Compare FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (declaring that section 230 provided no immunity against secondary-liability lawsuit for a website operator who encourages the development of offensive
content), Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2008) (same), and Jones v. Dirty World Ent.
Recordings, LLC (Jones III), 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 110–13 (E.D. Ky. 2012)
(same), with Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir.
2003) (concluding that a service provider was immune from liability after fashioning dating-service profiles, a questionnaire and encouraging posters to create all assertedly offensive content).
315. Compare Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a
website operator may be deprived of immunity if the operator “designs” its
website to be a portal for defamatory material), with M.A. v. Vill. Voice Media
Holdings, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 2011) (quoting Goddard v.
Google, No. C 08-2738 JF (PVT), 2008 WL 5245490, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2008))
(deciding that a website operator does lose its immunity merely because the
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Most definitely, the Author encourages congressional members to weigh
the previously discussed and significant bivariate statistical relationships, the
judicial splits, and their implications before amending or repealing the CDA
section 230. Still, it is important to remember a truism: statistically significant bivariate relationships do not prove, say, that certain predictor caused
courts to issue split decisions. And, bivariate findings do not prove that
courts are “irrationally biased” against, say, content creators or social media
providers.”316
As discussed in a different place, to increase the soundness, as well as
the inferential value of an investigator’s research findings, two essential
questions must be answered: (1) whether a sample of only reported judicial
decisions accurately and completely describe state and federal courts’ propensity to accept or reject, say, defendants’ federal-preemption defense;317
and (2) whether courts allow extralegal factors as well as probative facts and
legal doctrines to determine the outcomes of procedural or substantive disputes.318 Arguably, case-study results are more reliable and useful when investigators (1) test for “selectivity bias” in a sample of cases;319 (2) use more
website’s construction and operation might encourage or influence offensive
third-party postings).
316. Cf. Truth versus Truisms, ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2014), https://
www.economist.com/free-exchange/2014/02/07/truth-versus-truisms [https://
perma.cc/G9ZL-ZAMH] (agreeing that a comparison of the SP 500’s then-present returns to its full-year returns and the r-squared score were certainly statistically significant, yet stressing that the “aphorism” or bivariate relationship did
not have any “predictive power” (emphasis added)).
317. See Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord over Whether
Liability Insurers Must Defend Insureds’ Allegedly Intentional and Immoral
Conduct: A Historical and Empirical Review of Federal and State Courts’ Declaratory Judgments 1900–1997, 47 AM. U.L. REV. 1131, 1208–09 (1998)
[hereinafter Rice, Declaratory Judgments 1900–1997] (explaining the inferential limitations associated with a researcher’s analyzing reported decisions and
using only simple percentages to explain judicial outcomes and stressing that
unreported decisions must be included in the statistical analysis); Willy E.
Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Decisions over Whether Insurers Must
Defend Insureds that Violate Constitutional and Civil Rights: An Historical
and Empirical Review of Federal and State Court Declaratory Judgments
1900-2000, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 995, 1088–89 nn.431–32 (2000) [hereinafter
Rice, Declaratory Judgments 1900–2000].
318. Rice, Declaratory Judgments 1900–1997, supra note 317; Rice, Declaratory
Judgments 1900–2000, supra note 317.
319. The computation of this statistical test and its relevance have been discussed
elsewhere. See G.S. MADDALA, LIMITED-DEPENDENT AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN ECONOMETRICS, 257–71, 278–83 (1983) (discussing “self-selectivity
bias” and “other-selectivity bias”); Rice, Unconscionable Judicial Disdain,
supra note 289, at 143, 229 n.560; Rice, McCarran-Ferguson Act, supra note
289, at 399, 445–49 nn.213–219.
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“powerful” inferential statistics;320 and (3) measure the unique, combined,
and simultaneous effects of multiple probative facts on the dispositions of
disputes.321
Why should a researcher tests for “selectivity bias” in sample data? As
explained elsewhere,322 some litigants accept lower courts’ adverse rulings
and decide not to seek appellate review. Other litigants, however, refuse to
accept trial or federal district courts’ unfavorable rulings and contest those
decisions in state or federal appellate courts. Thus, a “selectivity bias” inquiry asks whether a difference exists between litigants who “decide to appeal” and those who “decide not to appeal.” And, if a statistically significant
difference exists between the two groups, a researcher can reasonably conclude that unique characteristics— rather than various predictors—explain
appealers’ likelihood of prevailing or losing in appellate courts.
Again, the present database comprises numerous “probative facts” about
various types of litigants who appealed adverse federal-preemption decisions.
The author, therefore, performed a multivariate, two-staged probit analysis.323 This statistical procedure tests for “selectivity bias” and determines the
unique, shared, and simultaneous effects of several extralegal and legal factors on the outcomes of federal-preemption disputes in state and federal appellate courts.324
Table 4 presents the results of a multivariate-probit analysis, focusing
primarily on the 909 appellate decisions in the sample.325 Five clusters of
320. See MADDALA, supra note 319.
321. See id.
322. The computation of this statistical test and its relevance have been discussed
elsewhere. See MADDALA, supra note 319, at 257–71, 278–83 (discussing
“self-selectivity bias” and “other-selectivity bias”); Rice, Unconscionable Judicial Disdain, supra note 289, at 143, 229 n.560; Rice, McCarran-Ferguson
Act, supra note 289, at 445–49 nn.213–19.
323. In several published law journal articles, the author explains and applies probit
analysis to uncover the exclusive, combined, and simultaneous effects of multiple factors on the dispositions of various insurance-law disputes in courts of
appeals. See Rice, Declaratory Judgments 1900–2000, supra note 317, at
1088–94 nn.431–32; Rice, Declaratory Judgments 1900–1997, supra note 317,
at 1208–14 n.386–87; see also Willy E. Rice, Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Title VI, Title IX, and Section 504: A Pre- and Post-Grove City
Analysis, 5 REV. LITIG. 219, 286–88 nn.406–409 (1986) [hereinafter Rice, Preand Post-Grove City Analysis]. In addition, the author used StataCorp’s Stata
Statistical Software to analyze the data, compute robust standard errors, and
generate multivariate-probit coefficients.
324. See Rice, Declaratory Judgments 1900–2000, supra note 317, at 1088–94
nn.431–32; Rice, Declaratory Judgments 1900–1997, supra note 317, at
1208–14 n.386–87; see also Rice, Pre- and Post-Grove City Analysis, supra
note 323, at 219, 286–88 nn.406–09.
325. See infra table 4.
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“probative facts” are illustrated. Also, two distributions of probit values—
along with robust standard errors—appear in the table.

.6823
-1.1298
-.1549
-.0440
.3126
.2118
-1.1694
1.3726

-1.2406
-.0417

APPELLATE COURTS’ LOCATIONS
Eastern States
Southern States
Western States

LITIGANTS’ LEGAL STATUSES
PlaintiffsʊSmall Businesses
DefendantsʊUsers & Third Parties

PLAINTIFFS’ UNDERLYING LEGAL ACTIONS
Intentional -Tort Actions
Negligence-Based Actions

INTERACTION EFFECTS ʊPLAINTIFFS
Social Media*Professionals
Social Media*Small Businesses
Social Media*Parents
Social Media*Children

INTERACTION EFFECTS ʊDEFENDANTS &
UNDERLYING CAUSES OF ACTION
Social Media*Service Providers
Social Media*Intentional Torts

†

Levels of statistical significance for the Chi Square test:
*** d .001
** p d .01
This total includes federal-preemption disputes involving the CDA, FAA and CERCLA.

Wald test for independent equations (“selectivity bias”): Chi square = 1.80, p-value >.15

.3594
.4384

.4006
.2680
.9151
.7905

.1960
.5082

.2680
.5082

* p d .05

3.45 ***

2.55 **
2.22 *

1.94 *
4.84 ***
-.2068

-.2737
.6039
.2074

Independent and Joint Effects of Extrajudicial and
Legal Factors on Deciding to Appeal and Outcomes
.1414
.1248
.1298

Litigants Who Decided to Appeal
Adverse Preemption Rulings
Probit
Robust
Z
Values
Std. Errors

.3384
-.6829

.9107
.5124
.1802
-.6044

.0117
-.2864

-.1622
.4200

-.2992
-.3346
.0887

.1734
.1617

.1187
.2144
.2695
.1881

.1236
.1989

.1289
.0682

.1035
.0753
2.33 *

1.95 *
4.22 ***

3.21 ***

7.67 ***
2.39 **

6.16 ***

2.89 **
4.45 ***

Results of Federal Preemption Disputes
In State and Federal Appellate Courts
Probit
Robust
Z
Values
Std. Errors
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First, examine the probit values which appear under the heading “Litigants Who Decided to Appeal Adverse Preemption Rulings.” Those values
answer the question: whether or not the predictors’ independent, joint, and
simultaneous effects significantly influenced litigants’ decisions to appeal
lower courts’ adverse federal-preemption rulings. The asterisks describe the
probit values’ levels of statistical significance.326 And, the results strongly
suggest that some factors substantially influenced litigants’ decisions more
than others. To illustrate, litigants who resided in Eastern states were less
likely (-.2737) to appeal questionable preemption rulings. Southern litigants,
however, were more likely (.6039) to appeal. Also, consider two interesting
but unsurprising results: Plaintiffs— small-business owners—were more
likely (.6823) to appeal federal-preemption rulings. But, defendants—users
and third-party entities—were less likely (-1.1298) to appeal.
Of course, the paramount concern remains: whether or not “selectivity
bias” appears in the sample. Or, stated more narrowly, the question is
whether there are remarkable differences between, say, social media litigants
who decided to appeal adverse section 230-preemption rulings and those who
decided not to appeal. To find the answer, a “test for similarities” between
the two distributions of probit values or two equations was needed. At the
bottom of Table 4, a Wald test for independent equations appears. The Chisquare value is not statistically significant. Therefore, it suggests and only
suggests that no error-generating or significant self-selection bias appears in
the sample.
Once more, reconsider the study’s central question: whether appellate
courts—intentionally or unintentionally—allow the unique, combined, and
concurrent contributions of both legal and extrajudicial predictors to influence the outcomes of federal-preemption disputes. The short answer is yes.
Examine the probit values in Table 4 under the heading “Results of Federal
Preemption Disputes in State and Federal Appellate Courts.” Nine of the corresponding positive and negative probit values are statistically significant.
To be honest, the four positive coefficients were totally unexpected,
given that courts of appeals almost universally and consistently declare that
the CDA section 230(c)(1) provides broad immunity against third-party victims’ lawsuits when large tech companies publish users’ purportedly injurious “toxic comments,” “hazardous videos,” or “filthy pictures.”327 Briefly,

326. See e.g., Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 100 n.144 (2011) (reporting probit coefficients, t-statistics, standard errors, and the marginal effects of independent and control
predictors on individuals’ likelihood of voting, and the representative indicators
for the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance).
327. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Courts have
construed the immunity provisions in § 230 broadly in all cases arising from
the publication of user-generated content.”); Carafano v. Metrosplash.Com,
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the positive coefficients suggest that the predictors significantly increase
complainants’ likelihood of winning federal-immunity disputes.
Therefore, consider the first positive (.4200) probit coefficient. It suggests that plaintiffs generally are more likely to win immunity-preemption
disputes when the defendants are content creators or third-party entities. But
even more revealing, the positive coefficients — .9107 and .5124, respectively—indicate that professionals and small-business entities have a greater
likelihood of winning CDA-immunity disputes than other social media users.
Furthermore, the positive and statistically significant .3384 suggests: Plaintiffs are more likely to win federal-preemption disputes when defendants in
the underlying lawsuits are social media providers rather than other providers of other goods and services. Conversely, the negative probit values— .2992, -.3346, and -.2066 —strongly indicate social media and other complainants are substantially less likely to win preemption disputes in Eastern,
Southern, and Western courts of appeals.
Perhaps, among the nine significant findings, the last two are the most
surprising and troublesome. Congress passed the CDA to “protect children
from sexually explicit internet content.”328 In fact, the CDA section 230(b)(4)
states in pertinent part: “[i]t is the policy of the United States . . . to remove
disincentives for the development . . . of blocking and filtering technologies
that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or
inappropriate online material.”329 Yet, the -.6044 coefficient in Table 4
strongly suggests: Minors and younger children are statistically and significantly less likely to win section 230 immunity contests. Moreover, the -.6829
value indicates that appellate courts are substantially more likely to shield
platform providers from content creators’ or third parties’ intentional-tortbased lawsuits.
What explains this apparent contradiction? As reported earlier, Congress
amended the CDA in 1995 by adding section 230(c)(1)—the safe-harborimmunity provision. However, Congress also added section 230(b)(2),330
finding that “tort-based lawsuits [would threaten] freedom of speech in the
new and burgeoning Internet medium.”331 The latter provision states in relevant part: “[i]t is the policy of the United States . . . to preserve the vibrant
and competitive free market . . . for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by federal or state regulation.”332

Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing several appellate-court
decisions).
328. See FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016).
329. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4).
330. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
331. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
332. Id.
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Consequently, courts must protect the interests of the free market as
well as children under sections 230(b)(2) and 230(b)(4), respectively. It appears, however, that courts do not have constitutional powers and/or the technological acumen to protect simultaneously, decidedly, and equally the
broader free-markets and narrower children’s interests. The Texas Supreme
Court provides some support for this argument in a fairly recent opinion, In
re Facebook, Inc. and Facebook, Inc. d/b/a Instagram.333 The supreme court
wrote:
[Today, the Internet does not look like it did] when Congress enacted section 230. [The Constitution gives Congress rather than
courts the power] to modernize outdated statutes. Perhaps advances in technology [will allow online platforms to police their
users’ posts more easily, which would reduce providers’ liability
costs] for failing to protect users . . . . On the other hand, . . .
[making platform providers vicariously liable] for their users’ injurious activity would [encourage providers] to censor “dangerous” content to avoid lawsuits. Judges are poorly equipped to
make such judgments.334
VII.

CONCLUSION

Undeniably, social media has altered how the general public as well as
financial, political, and educational institutions exchange information, establish relationships, organize ventures, advertise services, sell products, and
access news.335 Yet, an overwhelming majority of Americans distrust social
media proprietors. especially the owners of Facebook, YouTube, WeChat,
WhatsApp, Instagram, Twitter, and TikTok.336
Parents, conservatives, progressives, Democrats, and Republicans337 allege that YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, and other big tech companies are
333. 625 S.W.3d 80 (Tex. 2021).
334. Id. at 101 (citing Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359–60 (2005) (“It is
for Congress, not this Court, to amend the statute if it believes [it is
outdated.])).
335. See Ortiz-Ospina, supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also The 7 Different Types of Social Media, supra note 16.
336. See Auxier, supra note 19; Tankovska, supra note 17; Larry Dignan,
Facebook, TikTok Least Trusted By Americans, Google Most Trusted, Says
Survey, ZDNET (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.zdnet.com/article/facebook-tiktokleast-trusted-by-americans-google-most-trusted-says-survey/ [https://perma.cc/
23MZ-DYCF].
337. See Perrigo, supra note 20 (arguing that social media platforms are like industrial factories—leaking toxic waste and needing plugs and regulations to detoxify its pollution); Reed & Steyer, supra note 20 (observing that polluters pay to
mitigate environmental damage and that the same remedy can detoxify the on-
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digitally polluting the internet ecosystem by allowing users to post and share
extremely corrosive, toxic, and illegal content.338 Other critics assert tech
companies’ supposedly objective content-moderation algorithms are inherently biased.339 In particular, users and content creators assert: Platform providers’ content-moderation tools discriminate intentionally and irrationally on
the basis of one’s political association, socioeconomic status, gender, religious beliefs, and other impermissible attributes.340
Replying to the criticism, platform providers stress that section
230(c)(2)(A) of the Communications Decency Act encourages tech companies to remove any definitively or potentially “obscene, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing or otherwise objectionable” content.341 Platform providers also maintain that their content-moderation tools actually prevent users’ purportedly toxic, filthy, and harassing content from “digitally
polluting” social media platforms.342 In addition, platform owners stress that
their content moderation algorithms do not discriminate irrationally against
any particular class of users.343
line environment); Tracy & McKinnon, supra note 23 (arguing that big tech
firms must remove content which endanger the internet ecosystem.”); Weiner,
supra note 23 (“This bill would make irresponsible big tech companies accountable for the digital pollution they knowingly and willfully produce.”);
Hill, supra note 23 (arguing that large social-media companies should be liable
for toxic and illegal content).
338. See Perrigo, supra note 20; Reed & Steyer, supra note 20; Tracy & McKinnon,
supra note 23; Weiner, supra note 23; Hill, supra note 23.
339. See Lim, supra note 25 (“While AI is celebrated as autonomous technology, . . . it is inherently biased.”).
340. See, e.g., Douek, supra note 29 (“[T]ens of thousands of users are given the
boot in regular fell swoops. . . . They [even] deplatformed . . . the sitting President of the United States.”); Mac, supra note 32 (“Instagram . . . blocked
hashtags about one of Islam’s holiest mosques. . . . [This is] Instagram and its
parent-company Facebook’s latest content moderation failure.”); Lim & Alrasheed, supra note 34; Rosenberg & Fischer, supra note 35 (“TikTok . . .
asked moderators to suppress content from ‘ugly’ or ‘poor’ people to keep undesirable users away from the service.”).
341. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A); see also Feiner, supra note 44 (“Tech companies
have vigorously defended Section 230 . . . [before Congress, stressing that the
Act] allows them to remove the most objectionable content from their
platforms).
342. Cf. Taplin, supra note 24 ([T]wo mass shootings at mosques . . . were livestreamed on Facebook and . . . viewed millions of times on YouTube. . . .
[Although Facebook used] A.I. to block 90 percent of the Christchurch
streams, . . . Mark Zuckerberg [told] Congress that it might take five to 10
years to perfect these tools. But . . . banning toxic content must become the
highest priority at 8chan, Reddit, Facebook and YouTube.”).
343. Id.
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Nevertheless, responding to discontented constituents, more than fifty
congressional Republicans and Democrats have crafted approximately
twenty bills.344 The bills would repeal, reform, or “limit the scope” of the
CDA section 230.345 In theory, the reforms would increase content creators’
ability to survive a federal-preemption defense and sue platform providers on
the merits.346 However, as of this writing, CDA reformers have not explained
how their competing proposals would actually increase users’ ability to defeat a preemption challenge and allow litigants to seek various common-law
and statutory remedies in state and federal courts. Or, stated another way,
reformers have not presented any research findings or statistical evidence to
support their bills.
Still, it must be emphasized that the legal and quantitative analyses
presented in this Article do not prove definitively or otherwise that the proposed reforms will not work. Again, the purpose of this presentation is to
share some judicial guidance, which was gleaned from legal and statistical
analyses of section 230 and other federal-preemption decisions.
Once more, to “sanitize” social media platforms or remove allegedly
“digital pollution,” some proposals would add a broad rights-preservation
exemption to the CDA,347 like the rights-preservation clauses in the CER-

344. See generally Jeevanjee et al., supra note 57 (reporting that “a flurry of bills
[were] introduced [in Congress between] 2020 and 2021” and disclosing that
the Tech, Law, & Security Program at the American University-Washington
College of Law and at Duke University’s Center on Science & Technology
Policy are partnering to track all proposed section 230 legislation).
345. Id.
346. Cf. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254
(4th Cir. 2009) (“[I]mmunity is an immunity from [a lawsuit] rather than a
mere defense to liability and . . . is effectively lost if a case is erroneously
permitted to go to trial.”).
347. See S. 299, 117th Cong. (as introduced in the Senate on Feb. 8, 2021); see also
Press Release, Sen. Mark R. Warner, Sens. Warner, Hirono, Klobuchar Announce SAFE TECH Act to Reform Section 230 (Feb. 6, 2021), https://
www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2021/2/warner-hirono-klobuchar-announce-the-safe-tech-act-to-reform-section-230 [https://perma.cc/F4JV-N5X2]
(“[The enacted bill would] ensure that . . . online communities are not safe
harbors for [various violations. And, it] would make irresponsible big tech
companies [liable] for the digital pollution they knowingly and willfully produce.” (emphasis added)); Alexandra Berzon, Shane Shifflett & Justin Scheck,
Exchange—Amazon Has Ceded Control of Its Site—The Result: Thousands of
Banned, Unsafe or Mislabeled Products, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2019, at B1
(disclosing that an investigation found 4,152 “unsafe,” “dangerous,” “contaminated,” “hazardous” and “toxic” products—containing pesticides, lead, and
cadmium—on Amazon’s platform. “Some lawmakers have begun calling for
more regulation.” But Amazon insists “Section 230 of the CDA shields [it]
from liability for what others post.” (emphasis added)).
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CLA.348 However, assuming that Congress would add a CERCLA-like “sanitation” provision to the CDA, the previously discussed findings revealed
conclusively that the CERCLA’s rights-preservation clauses do not increase
complainants’ ability to survive a federal-preemption challenge and litigate
cleanup or “sanitation” claims in state or federal courts.349
Another suggested reform would add a hybrid rights-preservation and
safe-harbor provision to the CDA,350 like the frequently litigated section 2
clause in the Federal Arbitration Act.351 Why? “Terms of Services” agreements utilized by social media companies are enforceable contracts. Thus,
under the FAA, a complaining party may escape mandatory arbitration and
litigate a cause of action in a court of law if she survives a platform provider’s safe-harbor-preemption defense.352 However, the present empirical
investigation discloses mixed results when companies use an FAA-preemption defense. Generally, in trial and district courts, plaintiffs are more likely
to defeat an FAA-safe-harbor defense and receive permission to litigate
claims on the merits.353 On the other hand, state and federal appellate courts
are substantially more likely to embrace defendants’ safe-harbor arguments
and force complaining contractual parties to arbitrate rather litigate.354
348. 42 U.S.C. § 9601–9675.
349. See supra table 3 and the accompanying discussion.
350. See Rogers, supra note 24 (“H]ere is a modest proposal to . . . redress false,
wrongful or defamatory speech—without centering any censorship power
within social media company . . . and without repealing Section 230. . . . [Congress could create] a special fast-track arbitration system for social media
[speech-related disputes]”); see MacCarthy, supra note 286 (“New ideas for
digital governance are most urgent [to address] the information disorder within
the social medial industry [as well as] hate speech and disinformation . . . on
the largest platforms. . . . Congress should establish a non-governmental industry-public authority under the supervision of a federal regulatory commission to
provide affordable and efficient arbitration and mediation services to social media companies to satisfy this obligation for independent review.”).
351. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (“A written provision in any . . . contract evidencing . . . an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out
of such a contract, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”
(emphasis added)).
352. Id.
353. See table 3 and the accompanying discussion; see also Heidbreder v. Epic
Games, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 591, 597–98 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 3, 2020) (concluding
that the arbitration provision in the End User License Agreement was enforceable and granted Epic’s motion to compelling a sixteen-year-old minor to arbitrate an individual basis only breach-of-contract claim, even though the user
agreed to the terms while he was a minor child and did not have the legal
capacity to accept the contract).
354. See table 3 and the accompanying discussion.
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Perhaps, a more commonsensical legislative proposal would completely
abolish or “limit the scope” of big tech companies’ immunity under the
CDA’s safe-harbor provision.355 Why? The findings are clear: barring just a
few exceptions, section 230 generally precludes users’ litigating statutory
and tort-based claims on the merits in federal and state courts.356 Therefore,
Congress should add a user-friendly rights-preservation clause, which would
allow users, content creators, and third-party claimants to file specific tortbased and statutory causes of action against large social media providers.
Debatably, an unequivocal private-right-of-action exemption would also
achieve two desirable ends: (1) tech companies would increase their efforts
to remove users’ purportedly “excessively toxic,” “extremely dangerous,”
and “digitally polluted” content; and (2) social media owners would finely
adjust their content-moderation tools and end all types of irrational discrimination, allegedly on the basis of users’ political affiliation, ideology, gender,
and ethnicity.
Consider a final observation: At any moment in time, approximately
fifty-three percent of small businesses—within most industries—are litigating at least one lawsuit.357 Moreover, an estimated fifty percent of large companies are litigating between four and six cases.358 In light of these statistics,
some critics ask impliedly: Is it fair to abolish or severely restrict social media companies’ immunity under the Communications Decency Act section
230 and expose those entities potentially to individual and class-action lawsuits. The overwhelming majority of displeased users, parents, congressional
members, former and sitting U.S. presidents, as well as the competitive owners of mainstream-media, say yes.359

355. See generally Jeevanjee et al., supra note 57 (providing a list); see also H.R.
8896,116th Cong. (2019–2020) (proposing the Abandoning Online Censorship
Act, “a bill to repeal section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934—commonly referred to as the Communications Decency Act—to stop censorship,
and for other purposes”), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/housebill/8896/text?r=8&s=1. [https://perma.cc/QVH4-B2JX] (last visited Jan. 21,
2022).
356. See table 3 and the accompanying discussion.
357. Guest Writer, Five Reasons Small Businesses Get Sued and How to Avoid
Them, THEBOTTOMLINE (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.nationalfunding.com/
blog/reasons-businesses-get-sued/ [https://perma.cc/9Y7U-NJK2].
358. See NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, 2019 LITIGATION TRENDS ANNUAL SURVEY
(2019), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/-/media/files/nrf/nrfweb/knowledge-pdfs/final—-2019-litigation-trends-annual-survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z4PU-SHPY].
359. See Steven Hill, Biden Should Revoke Section 230 Before We Lose Our Democracy, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/
commentary/ct-opinion-section-230-big-tech-congress-pro-repeal-20210128oxzxss4zqvbxniussz5yyt4g74-story.html [https://perma.cc/UTF5-JBKU]
(stressing that traditional media does not have ironclad immunity from law-
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suit); Taplin, supra note 24 (stressing that broadcasters do not have any safeharbor protection against various lawsuits); Marguerite Reardon, Section 230:
How It Shields Social Media, and Why Congress Wants Changes, CNET (July
29, 2021), https://www.cnet.com/news/whats-section-230-the-social-medialaw-thats-clogging-up-the-stimulus-talks/ [https://perma.cc/6Y7P-7MKV]
(stating that President Donald Trump has called for the elimination of section
230); Editorial Board, Joe Biden Interview, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-inter
view.html?smid=NYtcore-ios-share [https://perma.cc/9QMH-83H7] (reporting
that Democratic Presidential Nominee Joe Biden is open to revising section
230).

